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I.  INTRODUCTION: A BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Manufacturing anti-personnel landmines is a business activity 
designed to accomplish the same fundamental goal as any other 
business—to maximize profits.  Landmine producers have always 
tried to sell their products for a profit in a competitive market.  They 
have carefully researched and designed their products to maximize 
effectiveness and to minimize costs. 
The producers’ efforts and this competitive business 
environment contributed to making landmines1 extremely cost-
effective for buyers.  Prices for some of the most popular and copied 
models were as low as three dollars,2 about the same cost as a pack of 
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 1 In this Article, the terms “landmines,” “mines,” or “APMs” refer to 
anti-personnel landmines, as distinguished from anti-tank mines, water mines, or 
unexploded ordnance.  This usage is purely a matter of convenience.  This Article 
does not explore liability arguments for this latter group of weapons. 
 2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY 56 (1993) [hereinafter 
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cigarettes or a McDonald’s Chicken McNugget Happy Meal.3  Unlike 
these inexpensive, consumable products, however, landmines were 
built to last, often beyond their original purpose, which may only be 
measured in weeks or days.  Decades after buyers deploy a landmine, 
it can still function as effectively as the day it was made.4 
These selling features—effectiveness, low cost, and long life—
not only increased sales and profits, but also unfortunately took the 
products beyond their intended use and directly caused an enormous 
number of deaths, injuries, and economic losses for unintended 
victims.  Further, their proliferation and durability have left an 
astonishing sixty to seventy million landmines still hidden 
underground in as many as ninety-three countries.5  They remain a 
 
DEADLY LEGACY].  Conventional landmines from Western countries range from as low 
as $5.80 for a mine from Quimica Tupan, which is in Brazil; to $6.15 per unit for a 
Valsella plastic, “non-detectable” mine from Italy; to $6.70 per unit for a Giat 
Industry mine from Belgium.  Id. at 56-57.  Non-Western mines often sell at or below 
the low end of this range, including less than $3.00 for the Chinese Type 72 mine.  
Id. at 56.  On the higher end, the popular Claymore mine—first developed in 1960 
and the last mine produced in the U.S. without a self-destruct mechanism—sold 
about ten years ago at $27.47 per unit.  Id. at 56, 65-66.  “An estimated seventy 
percent of Claymores will remain effective for more than twenty years in any 
climate”; they can kill “within a fifty-meter radius and may incapacitate within 100 
meters.”  Id. at 66.  “The Claymore made up eighty percent of all U.S. landmine 
exports during the 1980s.”  Id. at 65.  According to the International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (ICBL), the lowest cost anti-personnel landmines can sell for as little 
as $3 each.  International Campaign to Ban Landmines, at http://www.icbl.org (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with author).  A United Nations report states that 
average anti-personnel landmine prices range from $3 to $15 per unit including, for 
example, a Brazilian model at $5.80, a Belgian model at $6.70, some Chinese models 
at $3 to $4, and a U.S. sale of one million mines at a unit price of $11.21.  See DEADLY 
LEGACY, supra, at 62.  One of the authors, interviewing a former soldier who laid 
landmines during the Bosnian War, was told that some mines during that war could 
be purchased for the equivalent of $0.60 each.  Interview by Richard Murray with 
Senad, a former Bosnian soldier in Banja Luka, Republika Srpska, Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Aug. 18, 1998).  By comparison, the same U.N. report notes that some 
of the more sophisticated anti-tank mines from the United States and Europe can sell 
for thousands of dollars each.  Welcome to the United Nations, at 
www.un.org/english/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) (on file with the author). 
 3 This comparison was confirmed by a survey conducted by the authors on 
March 24, 2001 of prices at a Chicago area Walgreen’s drug store, where a pack of 
cigarettes sold for $4.39, and a McDonald’s restaurant, where a Chicken McNugget 
Happy Meal sold for $3.14. 
 4 Some experts estimate that landmines have an average life of 50 to 100 years.  
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EXPOSING THE SOURCE: U.S. COMPANIES AND THE PRODUCTION 
OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES 6 (1997) [hereinafter EXPOSING THE SOURCE]; see also 
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 66 (stating that approximately seventy percent of 
U.S. Claymore landmines, one of the most widely produced landmines in the world, 
“remain effective for more than twenty years in any climate”). 
 5 HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAMS, TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY 4 (1999) 
[hereinafter TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY] (asserting that ninety-nine countries are 
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threat to kill or maim more innocent civilians, waste agricultural 
land, and disrupt economic and social recovery in some of the 
world’s poorest states.6 
In fact, before the average person can read this Article, a 
landmine will explode because an innocent civilian—perhaps a 
farmer or a child—will have accidentally come in contact with it.7  He 
will be severely traumatized by the loss of a limb, burns, blindness, 
deafness, shock, and/or infection.8  Emergency medical care, if 
accessible, will be rudimentary by U.S. standards, and long-term 
medical care and psychosocial therapy will likely be unavailable.  He 
will find it difficult or impossible to earn a living.  He and his family, 
who were likely struggling before the explosion, will be devastated.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This may seem to be another horrible and sad event that 
occurred in a distant place, the unfortunate aftermath of a previous 
 
burdened with uncleared antipersonnel landmines and unexploded ordinance 
problems, and estimating the number of uncleared landmines at sixty to seventy 
million); see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 3 (estimating 85 to 100 million 
landmines deployed in at least 62 counties; id. at 10 n.15 (noting the similarities 
between uncleared mines and unexploded ordinances). 
 6 Most recently, in an effort to assess worldwide progress at resolving the 
landmine crisis, and specifically to monitor the implementation of the 1997 Mine 
Ban Treaty, the ICBL has begun researching and publishing annual reports, the 
“Landmine Monitor Reports.” See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ET AL., LANDMINE 
MONITOR REPORT 1999: TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO 
BAN LANDMINES (1999) [hereinafter MONITOR]; SHAWN ROBERTS AND JODY WILLIAMS, 
AFTER THE GUNS FALL SILENT: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF LANDMINES (1995) 
[hereinafter ENDURING LEGACY]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY 
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INT’L SEC. OPERATIONS, HIDDEN KILLERS: THE GLOBAL PROBLEM 
WITH UNCLEARED LANDMINES, A REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL DEMINING (1993) 
[hereinafter HIDDEN KILLERS]. 
 7 With a total of 26,000 victims annually, there is one landmine victim every 
twenty minutes.  See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 3. 
 8 Id. at 8-9; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 4. 
 9 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 4; see also ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9. 
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war that was little reported or understood in the United States.  The 
landmine, it might be assumed, was supplied by a radical or former 
Communist government, or by some mysterious foreign arms 
producer.  Neither the event nor its causes seem to involve the 
United States, although on a humanitarian level, there may be some 
comfort in knowing that U.S. funds support various relief agencies 
that will try to ease the suffering of this poor victim and his family. 
The involvement of U.S. entities in this tragedy, however, might 
shift U.S. perception of this event.  What if that landmine was built in 
Wisconsin or California, or its parts came from Illinois?  What if the 
producer was a well-known U.S. corporation, with its stock traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange and an annual report that listed profits 
generated, in part, from the sale of that landmine?  What if that 
corporation, when it had decided to participate in the landmine 
industry, knew or should have known its product was more likely to 
harm civilians after a war than combatants during the war?  Further, 
what if producers had known about an alternative design for their 
products that could have greatly reduced the risk of such grievous 
injuries to unintended victims yet still served the buyers’ needs?  
What if producers, to achieve more sales and greater profits, chose 
the cheaper and more dangerous product design? 
In sum, this Article will discuss whether and how landmine 
producers should be held legally liable when their products have 
directly caused foreseeable, and possibly avoidable injuries to 
innocent civilians.  The Article will begin, in Part II, with a review of 
the relevant facts and background, including statistics regarding the 
size of the landmine industry, the entities that make up the industry, 
and the innocent civilians who have been victimized by landmines.  
Next, Part III will provide a legal discussion on the right of injured 
civilians to recover damages for their losses, including a review of the 
viability of the various available causes of action.  Finally, Part IV will 
offer a summary and conclusion. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT FACTS 
In the 1990s, documentation on global landmine production, 
trade, and use, and the resulting impact on innocent civilians finally 
began to emerge.10  The discussion that follows includes a brief review 
 
 10 Most of this information, and its public dissemination, is largely due to the 
extensive work of the ICBL and its component organizations.  Much more 
information regarding the history of the mine action movement and the formation 
and continuing activities of the ICBL and related organizations is available through 
the annual Landmine Monitor Reports and the ICBL itself. 
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of the staggering numbers and life-altering injuries suffered by 
innocent citizens who are the victims of the landmine crisis.  More 
importantly, however, it also catalogues some of the sources and 
factors instrumental in creating this global crisis, thereby providing a 
basis for the subsequent legal discussions. 
A.  The Landmine Industry and Trade 
No one knows exactly how much money companies and 
government agencies have made producing and distributing 
landmines.  It is estimated, nonetheless, that the trade has involved 
billions of dollars.11  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, landmine 
production totaled approximately five to ten million units per year.12  
Around the world, an estimated 100 companies and government 
agencies competed for $50 to $200 million of annual business,13 
eventually designing more than 340 models of landmines14 and 
selling an estimated 190 million units during the period from 1968 to 
1993.15 
At the industry’s peak, no single entity could rely on landmines 
as a primary product line because so many companies and agencies 
were involved.16  In addition to competition, the fact that the cheapest 
models dominated the market also limited a single entity’s ability to 
rely solely on landmine production.17  These “dumb” mines, so 
named because they have no self-destruct or self-deactivation 
mechanism,18 account today for virtually all of the sixty to seventy 
million landmines hidden underground and the 250 million stored 
 
 11 While hundreds of millions of cheap landmines generated $3 to $15 each of 
revenue, resulting in total revenues of over one billion dollars, the newer and more 
sophisticated landmine models and systems involve considerably larger sums.  For 
example, one leading U.S. landmine producer and its subsidiary received $486 
million in APM and anti-tank contracts between 1985 and 1995.  United States 
Department of Defense records show that Alliant Techsystems (Hopkins, Minnesota) 
and its subsidiary, Accudyne Corporation (Janesville, Wisconsin), won contracts in 
this amount for production.  EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 3. 
 12 MONITOR, supra note 6, at 5; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 57. 
 13 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36. 
 14 Id. 
 15 MONITOR, supra note 6, at 5. 
 16 See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 35-37. 
 17 “Blast” landmines that explode from pressure are the most frequently 
encountered landmines around the world.  These fall into the category of so-called 
“dumb” landmines.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 6. 
 18 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65-69.  Prime examples of dumb landmines are 
the Russian PMN, the Chinese Type 72, the U.S. Claymore, and similar landmines 
based on the Claymore from other producers.  Id. 
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in warehouses.19 
B.  Producers and Exporters 
With profits near the billions and several hundred thousand 
victims worldwide, the question becomes—what entities produced 
and profited from the sale of these landmines?  This question, not 
surprisingly, is difficult to answer because of the complexity of the 
industry, the large number of landmine producers, and the high rate 
of landmine exportation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the past two decades, the landmine industry has become as 
complex and international as most other major manufacturing 
industries.  Typically, production involved several companies 
including, those that supplied components and others that 
completed assemblage.20  Approximately 100 private corporations and 
 
 19 MONITOR, supra note 6, at 11, 14-15.  Stockpiles are not of immediate concern 
for the purposes of this Article, but it should be noted that the 250 million figure is 
based on data collected by the Landmine Monitor Report in 1999 and is far higher than 
the previous common estimate of 100 million stockpiled landmines.  These are 
stored in 108 countries and, while the United States ranks fourth with eleven million 
mines, it is well behind China, which has 110 million; Russia, which has sixty to 
seventy million; and Belarus with tens of millions.  Id. at 11.  In one of the most 
hopeful events since the enactment of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty itself, the Landmine 
Monitor Report reported that although the total stockpile was much greater than 
previously believed, the number of APM producers has dropped, more than twelve 
million stockpiled mines have been destroyed, and, during 1998 and early 1999, no 
large scale use of landmines was found even though there was not a concurrent 
decrease in the level of armed conflict in the world.  Id. at 11.  The stockpiles are 
predominantly dumb mines, and it must be hoped that they will either eventually be 
destroyed, as contemplated in the Treaty, or at the least never deployed.  For further 
discussion on the destruction of landmine stockpiles, see Mary Wareham, 
Antipersonnel Landmine Stockpiles and their Destruction: Landmine Monitor Factsheet, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 1999). 
 20 This circumstance has caused some corporations, who are publicly identified 
with landmine production, to object that they are being unfairly connected to 
landmines since their role was limited to supplying components.  EXPOSING THE 
 2003 COMPENSATING LANDMINE VICTIMS 309 
government agencies, in fifty-nine countries, have contributed to the 
production of landmines.  Of that total, producers in thirty-four 
countries exported their products around the world (see Table 1).21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The leading landmine producers and exporters include the 
United States, but only up until the mid-1980s; China; Italy; and the 
former Soviet Union.22  Of the sixty to seventy million currently 
uncleared landmines, approximately nine to ten million originated in 
the United States23—a significant share considering fifty-nine 
 
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 2.  It should be noted that virtually every component of a 
landmine is necessary to make it the product that is so dangerous to innocent 
civilians. 
 21 The Landmine Monitor Report identifies fifty-nine current and former landmine 
producing countries, and names thirty-four past exporters.  See MONITOR, supra note 
6, at 5-10; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36 (discussing “48 countries which 
have manufactured more than 340 types of anti-personnel landmines”).  It should be 
noted that very few of the exporting countries suffer from concentrations of 
uncleared landmines, just as most of those countries suffering the worst 
concentrations have never exported or even produced landmines. 
 22 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 36. 
 23 Based on estimates by the United States Department of State, just less than 
fifteen percent of the uncleared landmines in the world originated in the United 
States, equal to 9 to 10.5 million of the 59.7 to 69.4 million landmines currently 
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countries have produced landmines. 
The exportation process adds to the identification problem 
because of its own complexities, often being conducted through 
intermediaries.  In addition, to avoid regulations or public 
opposition, some producers shifted production away from Western 
countries, once again making identification more difficult.24 
Further complicating the identification task is the fact that 
landmines have been a relatively small component of the highly 
secretive arms industry.  During the past decade, however, several 
dedicated and persistent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
have researched and published information about the landmine 
trade.25 
For the purposes of this Article, producers can be divided into 
three groups: foreign government agencies, foreign private 
corporations, and U.S. corporations (see Table 2). 
1.  Foreign Government Agencies 
Foreign government agencies include state factories and state-
owned corporations primarily in communist or formerly communist 
countries, including China, Russia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Vietnam, and the former Eastern Bloc.  Although their landmine 
products are well documented, little is known about the 
manufacturing entities or their operations. 
2.  Foreign Private Corporations 
 More information is available about some larger and more well-
known foreign corporations.  In 1993, The Arms Project, a division of  
 
uncleared in the world.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 14; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra 
note 2, at 62.  Based on their field experience, some demining experts attribute to 
the United States a greater percentage of uncleared landmines than does the State 
Department’s estimates.  DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 62. 
 24 The United Nations reported that, as public opinion began to mount against 
mines in Western countries, producers increasingly shifted assembly to local or 
regional subsidiaries.  See www.un.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2000).  As an example, 
the report noted that French and Italian producers had shipped their explosives to 
Singapore for assembly there.  Id.  These subsidiaries were also used for credit, 
financing, shipping and other aspects of manufacturing.  Id. 
 25 Primary researchers and publishers include Human Rights Watch, Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Physicians for Human Rights, ICBL, and 
some related organizations.  Working both separately and cooperatively, these 
organizations have published reports, which have been printed and often posted on 
their websites, listing producers, exporters, their products, and sometimes facts from 
procurement contracts or interviews with corporate leaders or spokespersons.  See, 
e.g., MONITOR, supra note 6; EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4; ENDURING LEGACY, 
supra note 6; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2. 
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Human Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights collaborated 
to investigate and publish their findings in Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, 
which includes a list of anti-personnel landmine types and, when 
known, their specific producers.26 
3.  U.S. Corporations 
The United States was a leading world producer and exporter of 
landmines during the 1960s and 1970s.  It extensively used landmines 
in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.27  Between 1969 and 1992, 
 
 26 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at app. 17 (charting anti-personnel landmine 
types and their producers). 
 27 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 17.  The entire industry actually developed first 
with anti-tank mines after World War I, which were then used extensively during 
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the United States exported at least 4.4 million landmines to thirty-two 
countries.28  The United States has always led the world in its variety 
of landmine types, offering thirty-seven models compared with most 
other countries offering typically five to fifteen models.29  
Manufacturing of landmines in the United States took place in 
twenty-three states.30  In 1975, annual exports peaked at 
approximately 1.4 million units, and then declined to very low 
numbers by 1982 and thereafter.31 
After the Vietnam War, the United States continued to produce 
and export “dumb” mines, but non-Western producers who could sell 
their products cheaper than the generally higher priced U.S. models  
 
World War II when they were often combined with anti-personnel mines (APMs).  Id. 
at 16.  APMs were subsequently used on a large scale during the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT, IN ITS OWN WORDS: THE U.S. ARMY AND 
ANTIPERSONNEL MINES IN THE KOREAN AND VIETNAM WARS 4, 7 (1997) [hereinafter IN 
ITS OWN WORDS].  The high rate of American casualties from U.S. mines in those 
wars raised strong debate about their military effectiveness.  See, e.g., EXPOSING THE 
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 8 n.18 (quoting retired Marine Corps Commandant General 
Alfred Gray Jr. as arguing “[w]e kill more Americans with our mines than we do 
anybody else.  We never killed many enemies with mines . . . .”).  An estimated ninety 
percent of the mines and booby traps used against U.S. troops in Vietnam were 
either United States made or included U.S. parts.  Id.  Sixty-five to seventy percent of 
United States Marine Corps casualties in Vietnam were from mines and booby traps.  
DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 18.  While maintaining its position as a leading 
producer and exporter of conventional APMs, the Vietnam experience in particular 
prompted the United States to increase its efforts at becoming the world leader in 
landmine technology.  For more detail, see IN ITS OWN WORDS, supra note 27. 
 28 Exports have included: 2.5 million landmines to Iran, 622,000 to Cambodia, 
437,000 to Thailand, 300,000 to Chile, and 102,000 to El Salvador.  MONITOR, supra 
note 6, at 328; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65.  American mines have been sold to 
Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Vietnam, and other countries.  DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65; 
see also MONITOR, supra note 6, at 328-29.  Other purchasers of U.S. mines have 
included: Australia, Belize, Brunei, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Indonesia, Jordan, South Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Peru, the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom.  DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 65. 
 29 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 54.  After the United States, Italy has the 
second largest variety of landmines with thirty-six models.  Id. 
 30 According to Exposing the Source, companies receiving prime contracts from the 
Pentagon for at least $1 million of landmine production between 1985 and 1995 
were located in: Minnesota ($336 million), California ($164 million), Wisconsin 
($150 million), Florida ($62 million), New York ($62 million), Pennsylvania ($51 
million), Illinois ($45 million), Kansas ($22 million), Indiana ($20 million), New 
Jersey ($18 million), Connecticut ($18 million), Alabama ($15 million), Iowa ($10 
million), Ohio ($8 million), Tennessee ($8 million), Maryland ($5 million), 
Michigan ($4 million), Texas ($4 million), and Virginia ($1 million).  EXPOSING THE 
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 13.  This list does not include subcontractors.  See id. 
 31 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 64, 105, 106. 
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increasingly supplied this market.32  United States producers then 
turned their attention to the more lucrative “smart” mine technology 
and production, and invested billions of dollars in corporate research 
and development.33  These new systems often involved “scatterable” 
models that could be dropped from aircraft or fired from artillery or 
launchers.34  Specifically, the United States Department of Defense 
spent $1.68 billion on scatterable landmine systems between 1983 
and 1992,35 and stockpiled an estimated $5 billion worth of these 
systems by 1993.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although reliable NGOs have identified U.S. companies in the 
landmine business, no information is available that can connect 
specific companies to their respective market shares during the 
highest period of U.S. use and export.  Some U.S. corporations, 
however, were identified in a 1993 report by Human Rights Watch 
 
 32 Id. at 38-39.  By the early 1990s, the newer “scatterable” models were being 
built in wholly private facilities, but reportedly the conventional landmines were only 
being manufactured in the United States by private firms under contract to operate 
government-owned facilities.  Id.  Conventional mine export sales efforts were made 
almost entirely by non-Western producers, based on a survey of arms trade 
advertising, brochures, and trade shows.  Id. at 39. 
 33 EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 8. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at n.16; see also United States Army, Anti-Personnel Land Mine Procurement and 
Production, at UNITED STATES ARMY INFORMATION PAPER (1992). 
 36 EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 9. 
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entitled, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy.37  Human Rights Watch 
continued its investigations after that 1993 report and, in 1997, 
published “Exposing the Source: U.S. Companies and the Production of 
Antipersonnel Mines.”38  This report was able to provide more details 
regarding the involvement of U.S. corporations in the landmine 
industry as a result of more information from government and 
private sources (see Table 3). 
C.  Intended Uses, Actual Uses, and Design of the Product 
Landmines have provided a number of uses—from advancing 
strategic military operations to targeting and terrorizing innocent 
civilians—for their different buyers.  For example, military landmine 
buyers, including both regular and irregular armies, typically used 
landmines for conventional military purposes.  These purposes were 
predominantly defensive and tactical, such as establishing a defensive 
perimeter, slowing an advancing enemy army in order to facilitate a 
retreat, and “channeling” the movement of enemy troops.39  
Landmines’ deterrent affects also benefited these buyers; the mere 
threat of landmines alone was often enough to deny the passage 
through or use of land.40  Other, typically non-military buyers, 
however, intentionally used landmines to injure and terrorize 
civilians, depopulate regions, and cripple economic and social 
structures.  They targeted agriculture, transportation, and even 
schools and water sources.41 
 Whether or not landmine producers specifically knew how their 
products would be used, they did know what the buyers wanted their 
product to accomplish.  Producers designed their products to kill or, 
more effectively, severely maim people who then required others to  
 
 37 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 72-73. 
 38 Id. at app. A. 
 39 ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 4 
 40 Id. at 4-5 (describing the military perspective on landmine use). 
 41 See Shawn Roberts, No Exceptions, No Reservations, No Loopholes, The Campaign For 
The 1997 Convention on The Prohibition of the Development, Production, Transfer, and Use of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 371, 
375-76 (1998).  These latter uses clearly violate the requirements of proportionality 
and discrimination between military uses and civilian consequences under 
international law.  Nevertheless, whether or not such uses of the product conform 
with established international laws, they mostly occurred during wars and armed 
conflicts.  The very idea of regulating warfare—agreeing to “acceptable” methods 
and conditions for killing and wounding humans—is a relatively recent 
phenomenon of civilization that, unfortunately, has not yet found either effective or 
consistent enforcement.  Further, in the use and misuse of landmines, the actors 
were the armies.  Id. at 376. 
 316 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2003 COMPENSATING LANDMINE VICTIMS 317 
care for them.42  Of course, none of these products could distinguish 
between combatants and civilians, and most landmine producers 
made no effort to reduce the threat to post-conflict civilians by 
including simple and readily available43 mechanisms to self-destruct 
or self-deactivate the landmines after a certain time period 
reasonable for their intended uses. 
Is it possible that most of the sixty to seventy million unexploded 
landmines currently threatening civilians around the world could 
have been manufactured to self-destruct within a few days or weeks 
after their original military use?  Such a safer alternative could have 
avoided the vast majority of civilian injuries, as well as the associated 
human suffering and medical costs.  In addition, a host of other 
direct and indirect landmine damages, including the economic and 
societal costs due to the loss of land use, might have been greatly 
reduced if self-destruct technology had been employed earlier. 
Indeed, self-destruct technology has been available since the 
early days of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, first to U.S. 
landmine producers and shortly after to foreign producers.44  
Although these first mechanisms were relatively primitive, they did 
not interfere with the landmines’ intended military uses.  Some 
experts might even argue that self-destruct landmines could have 
enhanced U.S. military effectiveness in Vietnam because the U.S. 
 
 42 Examples of landmines designed specifically to maim but not kill include the 
British Ranger scatterable mine, Spanish P-4-A, Swedish L1-11, United States M14, 
and the Pakistani P4 MK2.  DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 22.  Regarding this latter 
model, a Pakistan Ordinance Factories brochure, “Technical Specifications for Mine 
Anti-Personnel (P4 MK2),” states, 
This mine has been designed with a view to disable personnel.  
Operating research has shown that it is better to disable a man than to 
kill him.  A wounded man requires attention, conveyance and 
evacuation to the rear, thus causes disturbances in the traffic lanes of 
the combat area.  Also, a wounded person has a detrimental 
psychological effect on his fellow soldiers. 
EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 5. 
 43 For a discussion on the early availability of technology for self-destructing 
landmines, see infra PART III. 
 44 The BLU 42/B mine included a primitive, electrical self-destruct mechanism 
and was used by the United States in Vietnam in 1966, but was available as early as 
1964.  Interview with Mark Hiznay, Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch (Jan. 8, 
2001).  This mine, usually dropped by aircraft in a cluster bomb, was also used in 
Laos and Cambodia.  Id.  Another U.S. self-destructing landmine used in Vietnam 
was the “gravel mine” which had a canvas casing and included a chemical self-
destruct mechanism.  Id.  Over time, two vials inside the mine would chemically 
dissolve and neutralize the device.  Id.  This mine was also dropped from airplanes, 
but its use was discontinued due to the difficulty of keeping the mines chilled prior 
to their use.  Id. 
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“dumb” landmine, which was taken by opposing forces and used 
against U.S. troops, was the greatest single cause of U.S. casualties in 
Vietnam.45 
The availability of self-destruct technology more than thirty-five 
years ago, before the majority of the sixty to seventy million 
landmines now threatening civilians were manufactured,46 raises an 
obvious question: If that technology could have prevented so many 
unintended civilian injuries and related costs, while still providing the 
products’ intended military uses, why was this safer alternative largely 
ignored?  It is difficult to imagine that the marginal cost of including 
self-destruct technology was prohibitive, especially when compared to 
the easily foreseeable grievous injuries and immense costs from not 
including any self-destruct technology. 
D.  Landmine Victims and Their Needs 
“Landmine victims” include many individuals harmed in ways 
other than direct injury from a landmine explosion.  For instance, 
landmine infestation has rendered enormous amounts of land useless 
and those property owners have suffered economic loss.47  Even 
worse, such loss of useful land has displaced thousands of civilians, 
who then may have become internally displaced citizens or refugees.48  
It also has deterred the return of others.49  Competition for mine-free 
land can interfere with post-conflict resettlement efforts, as well as 
cause over-grazing and even accelerate deforestation.50  The focus of 
 
 45 For example, in Vietnam during the year 1965, between sixty-five and seventy 
percent of U.S. Marine Corps casualties were the result of landmines and booby 
traps.  DEADLY LEGACY, supra  note 2, at 18.  Another report found that ninety percent 
of all mine and booby-trap components used against U.S. troops in Vietnam were of 
U.S. origin.  EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 6.  These and related data are 
discussed more fully later in the “Government Contractor Defense” section of this 
Article.  See infra PART III.G.3. 
 46 The Enduring Legacy estimates that more than sixty-five million landmines were 
laid during the period between 1980 and 1995.  See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, 
at 3.  After allowing for additional mines and demining since 1995, this estimate 
indicates that the majority of the sixty to seventy million mines currently 
endangering civilians were placed since 1980.  No data is available on the 
manufacturing dates for these mines, but presumably most were manufactured after 
1964. 
 47 Accord Roberts, supra note 41, at 375-76. 
 48 Id. (discussing depopulation of entire geographic areas). 
 49 Even the threat of mines can displace civilians.  As an example, in 1996 a 
Mozambique village was abandoned by its entire population of 10,000 due to alleged 
mine infestation.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 15.  Subsequent demining efforts 
uncovered a total of four landmines.  Id. 
 50 ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 11. 
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this Article, however, is civilian landmine victims who have suffered 
personal injuries directly caused by landmines during post-conflict 
periods. 
The actual number of landmine victims in the world is unknown 
at this time.  Accurate data from affected countries is difficult to 
obtain due to lack of funding as well as political or military 
influences.51  Nevertheless, the number is very large.  The United 
Nations has estimated the total number of civilian landmine victims 
at 300,000, and in 1994, reported the number of landmine-disabled 
people, in particular amputee mine victims that require prosthetics 
care, at 250,000.52  Landmine explosions causing injuries, sometimes 
referred to as “incidents” or “events,” presently occur worldwide at a 
rate of 26,000 per year, equal to about seventy each day or one every 
twenty minutes.53  These figures, in addition to being somewhat 
dated, may underestimate the total because not all landmine injuries 
are reported due to the remote locations of such events and other 
factors.54 
Another complicating factor is the fact that these civilian victims 
are located in many countries.55  Examples of some of the countries 
with the worst landmine infestation and civilian impact include 
Angola, where one in 334 inhabitants are amputees and roughly fifty 
percent of the country is infested with an estimated six million 
mines.56  Many of these mines are concentrated around 
infrastructure, schools, churches, water supplies, and healthcare 
facilities.57  In Cambodia, littered with four to six million landmines, 
one of every forty-five Cambodians are amputees and more than fifty 
 
 51 See MONITOR, supra note 6, at 24. 
 52 Assistance in Mine Clearance: Report to the Secretary-General, 49th Sess., Agenda 
Item 22, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/49/357 (1994).  In 1999, the Landmine Monitor Report 
estimated the number of landmine survivors in the world at 300,000.  MONITOR, supra 
note 6, at 28. 
 53 This rate is the most commonly quoted from numerous sources but originated 
with the United States Department of State.  HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 6, at 1; see 
also ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 3.  In some subsequent instances the annual 
rate of 26,000 is noted as referring to all injuries while other sources quote that 
figure for the number of deaths and note that thousands of non-lethal injuries also 
occur. 
 54 While recognizing that more accurate data may be very important for planning 
and implementing victim assistance programs, this Article uses the estimate of 
250,000 to 300,000 civilian landmine victims to approximate scale. 
 55 This is not surprising because landmines and other unexploded ordinance 
currently are located in ninety-three countries.  TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra 
note 5, at 4. 
 56 Id. at 7. 
 57 Id. 
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new casualties are added each month.58  Central America’s most 
mine-infested country is Nicaragua.  In that country, civilians 
comprise eighty-five percent of all landmine injuries and eighty-seven 
percent of landmine deaths.59  It should be noted that each of these 
three countries is infested with U.S. mines60 and are all receiving U.S. 
financial aid for demining efforts and victim assistance.61 
Landmine victims often suffer loss of limbs, burns, blindness, 
deafness, and a wide variety of other physical injuries.  Extensive 
blood loss and infection are also common, in part, because landmine 
explosions destroy blood vessels over large areas of the body and they 
typically drive dirt, bacteria, clothing, and other foreign matter into 
tissue and bone.62  Reported death rates from landmine injuries 
range from 3.7 percent to fifty-nine percent,63 depending greatly on 
the type of mine, the delay between injury and emergency medical 
care, and the quality of that medical care.64 
The delay for many landmine victims in reaching proper 
medical care, which can be hours or even days, is an especially 
aggravating circumstance.  Immediate evacuation and prompt 
surgical care for landmine victims are critical to minimizing related 
deaths and disabilities.  Military personnel during a conflict may have 
access to trained medics, helicopters, and well-equipped medical 
facilities, but civilians injured by mines in post-conflict areas generally 
do not have such support.  A 1991 study conducted in Cambodia, for 
example, found that injured civilians from rural areas waited an 
average of twelve hours after their injuries to reach a hospital with 
 
 58 Id. at 18.  It is worth noting that this new casualty rate is a marked reduction 
from 1991 when Cambodia was suffering 300 to 700 amputations per month or an 
annual amputation rate of about 1 per 1,500 Cambodians.  Asia Watch & Physicians 
for Human Rights, Landmines in Cambodia: The Coward’s War, at HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH  36 (1991).  By comparison, in 1989 the amputation rate in the United States 
from all traumatic injuries was about 1 per 22,000 Americans.  Eric Stover & Dan 
Charles, The Killing Minefields of Cambodia, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 27. 
 59 MONITOR, supra note 6, at 274 (reporting a total of 423 civilian injuries versus 
seventy-six military injuries, and a total of forty-six civilian deaths versus seven 
military deaths). 
 60 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 104 
 61 TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra note 5, at 7, 18. 
 62 Id. at 121. 
 63 ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9.  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross reports a mortality rate of 3.7 percent for landmine victims at hospitals, but 
households in Cambodia and Afghanistan have shown death rates of thirty-one 
percent and fifty-nine percent, respectively, suggesting that many victims do not 
reach hospitals and may never be reported. 
 64 See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9 (presenting country-specific mortality 
rates and discussing heightened mortality for those victims who do not make it to a 
hospital, as well as the often rudimentary first aid that victims receive). 
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surgical care.65  In Angola, the average wait is reportedly thirty-six 
hours.66 
Even if a civilian victim can reach a hospital, the available care 
can be limited due to the lack of supplies, equipment, and skilled 
personnel.  Long-term care and therapy is even less likely.  Countries 
most severely affected by landmines can provide services for only 
fifteen to twenty percent of the needs of the physically disabled, a 
category encompassing more than landmine victims.67  These 
healthcare limitations inevitably lead to higher death rates and more 
serious long-term physical handicaps for landmine victims. 
Not surprisingly, the impact on children is the worst.  Their 
smaller bodies are less capable of surviving the extensive blood loss 
associated with most landmine injuries.  Loss of a limb for a growing 
child also has greater ramifications.  A child should receive a new 
prosthesis every six months, compared with an adult’s needs of every 
three to five years.68  This means that children who have lost limbs to 
landmines may need in their lifetimes twenty to thirty or more 
prostheses, which each cost approximately the average annual 
income of an adult in their countries.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These types of facts only begin to tell the story, but landmine 
victims’ fundamental needs are well established.  First, landmine 
victims need emergency medical care, surgeries, and physical 
rehabilitation.  Second, amputees need prosthetics, wheelchairs, and 
 
 65 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 127. 
 66 Id. 
 67 INT’L TRUST FUND FOR DEMINING AND MINE VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA, TO HEAL THE WOUNDS OF EARTH AND SOUL (1998). 
 68 DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 130 (referring to estimates made by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross). 
 69 Id. 
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crutches.  Additionally, most victims need psychosocial rehabilitation 
and therapy, and many suffer from social stigmas in their cultures.  
All victims need reintegration into their societies and assistance in 
returning to productive lives.70  Most of these needs are long-term, 
especially for the children. 
The costs of fully providing for the needs of landmine victims is 
difficult to ascertain.  No accurate estimates are available. Of mine-
infested countries investigated, “families reported having to spend 
the equivalent of up to two-and-one-half times their annual income 
on immediate costs related to the mine injuries.”71  This is consistent 
with the ICBL estimate that landmine survivors’ basic needs would 
average $9,000 per victim, which, when multiplied by its estimate of 
300,000 victims, led to a call by the ICBL for $3 billion in worldwide 
assistance for landmine victims.72  Restoring victims to productive lives 
with proper long-term care, therapy, training, and social 
reintegration, however, would arguably cost much more than these 
estimates suggest. 
In sum, approximately 250,000 to 300,000 landmine victims have 
suffered grievous personal injuries that are often inadequately 
treated, and approximately seventy more civilians around the world 
are injured every day.  Most victims experience permanent disability, 
loss of income, disruption of their families, and social stigma.  Very 
few receive sufficient long-term care, rehabilitation services, or 
vocational training.  None of them are at fault for their injuries.  The 
financial cost of properly treating their injuries and caring for their 
needs is unknown but almost certainly would be measured in billions 
of dollars. 
III.  LEGAL LIABILITY FOR LANDMINE PRODUCERS UNDER UNITED 
STATES LAW 
A.  Introduction 
As discussed in Parts I and II, landmines have caused the serious 
injury or death of hundreds of thousands of civilians around the 
world.  The injuries of civilians and their right to recover will be the 
 
 70 MONITOR, supra note 6, at 25. 
 71 ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 9. 
 72 In April of 1998, the Victim Assistance Working Group of the ICBL, based on 
its members’ own field experience and survey results from WHO, UNICEF, the 
American Red Cross, and others, developed a matrix of various costs associated with 
the basic medical and rehabilitative needs of landmine survivors to arrive at the 
$9,000 figure.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 28. 
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focus of the following legal analysis. 
A landmine is no different than most other products—it is a 
good supplied to others for use.  Manufacturers of landmines should 
be held liable, just as other manufacturers are held responsible and 
accountable, for the dangerous condition of or defects in their 
products.  In order to compensate innocent civilian victims and 
prevent future injuries, producers of landmines must take 
responsibility for the damage their products have caused and 
continue to cause.  If they are held responsible and forced to 
compensate individual victims for their injuries, it is likely that most 
producers will discontinue production of landmines for fear of 
lawsuits.  Similarly, producers, faced with the possibility of endless 
litigation given the millions of currently active landmines, may take 
an active role in demining efforts. 
Several causes of action, some stronger than others, could lead 
to compensation for landmine victims.  Several questions, however, 
must be answered before these causes of action can be pursued by, or 
on behalf of, the victims.  These questions include the following: (1) 
who are the potential plaintiffs; (2) will individual suits or class 
actions be most appropriate; (3) who should be named as 
defendants; (4) should the suits be brought in state or federal court; 
and (5) what substantive law will govern the adjudication of these 
claims?  Resolving these and related questions will lead to a 
determination of what kind of suit might be brought.  Possible 
approaches include products liability, strict liability, negligent 
entrustment, and intentional tort.  After determining the cause of 
action, consideration turns to the form of relief, calculation of 
damages, and available defenses. 
B.  Plaintiffs 
1.  Definition 
Landmines directly and indirectly affect many persons.  For the 
purposes of this Article, however, landmine victims as potential 
plaintiffs are defined as non-combatants who have suffered personal 
injuries directly caused by landmine explosions during post-conflict 
periods.  In other words, the potential plaintiffs are civilians injured 
by landmines that were manufactured without self-detonating 
devices, also known as “dumb mines,” and then left in place after a 
conflict had ended. 
Excluded as potential plaintiffs are combatants and civilian 
victims injured during period of conflict because certain defenses 
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likely would bar their claims.  Also excluded are persons who have 
lost property or property value due to landmine infestation because 
the nature of their claims varies too greatly from the personal injuries 
suffered by the first defined group. 
Nevertheless, even though this definition of potential plaintiffs 
excludes those injured during military conflicts and those injured by 
property damage, the number of potential plaintiffs remains very 
large.  As discussed above, it is estimated that landmine victims 
number between 250,000 and 300,000.73  Further, the most accepted 
estimate for new landmine injuries is a worldwide rate of 26,000 per 
year, equal to about seventy each day or one every twenty minutes.74  
It can be expected, despite demining and landmine awareness 
programs, that this rate will not significantly decrease in the near 
future because approximately sixty to seventy million landmines 
presently threaten civilians.75 
Further complicating the group of current and future landmine 
victims as potential plaintiffs is the fact they are located in many 
countries.76  Although 100,000 U.S. citizens have been landmine 
victims during the twentieth century,77 this Article assumes that all 
potential plaintiffs are foreign nationals. 
Finally, the potential plaintiffs suffer a wide range of injuries—
many of which may result in death—including loss of limbs, burns, 
blindness, deafness, loss of blood, infection, and other physical 
injuries in addition to psychological damage.  Of course, death may 
result from these injuries.  This diversity in the nature and severity of 
injuries could hinder a class action approach that requires 
commonality of factual issues, although this effect might be lessened 
by dividing the plaintiffs into subclasses, as discussed later in this 
Article. 
2.  Class Action 
Class action lawsuits are a viable option for landmine victims 
because individual suits may become burdensome or take too much 
 
 73 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 74 See id. 
 75 TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra note 5, at 4. 
 76 See ENDURING LEGACY, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that landmines are found in 
sixty-four countries, primarily developing states); see also TO WALK THE EARTH IN 
SAFETY, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that ninety-three countries are affected by either 
landmines or unexploded ordnance). 
 77 Harry N. Hambric & William C. Schneck, The Antipersonnel Mine Threat: A 
Historical Perspective, Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cal., November 18-22, 1996, at 1. 
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time and money to pursue.  For example, one particular plaintiff 
could represent other similarly-situated landmine victims without 
each victim having to take an active role in the pursuit of litigation. 
To bring a class action lawsuit, several requirements must be 
met.  In federal court, there are four prerequisites under Rule 23(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and three requirements 
under Rule 23(b)(3).  First, under Rule 23(a), there must be a 
sufficient number of class members so as to render joinder of all 
members “impracticable.”78  Second, common questions of law or fact 
must exist.79  Third, the class member who acts as the representative 
must “‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the 
class members.”80  Finally, the class representative must be able to 
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”81 
To bring a class action, a class also must meet the requirements 
of 23(b)(1),82 (2)83 or (3).84  Because landmine victims would seek 
monetary damages as their predominate form of relief, Rule 23(b)(3) 
is the most appropriate class device.  Therefore, common questions 
of law or fact must “predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual [class] members.”85  Second, the class action must be 
superior to all other possible methods of litigation.86  Finally, there 
can be no undue management difficulties in bringing a class action.87 
The requirements of Rule 23 will probably only be met in the 
case of landmine victims if class members are divided into smaller 
 
 78 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 79 Id. 
 80 East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 81 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 82 Id. at 23(b)(1).  Rule 23(b)(1) allows certification of a class when “the 
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would 
create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for 
the party opposing the class . . . .”  Id. at 23(b)(1)(A).  Rule 23(b)(1)(B) allows 
certification where “adjudications with respect to individual members of the class . . . 
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not 
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect 
their interests . . . .”  Id. at 23(b)(1)(B). 
 83 This part of the Rule allows certification where “the party opposing the class 
has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby 
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with 
respect to the class as a whole . . . .”  Id. at 23(b)(2).  The merit of this part of the 
rule as applied to landmine victims will be discussed below. 
 84 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 23(b)(3). 
 87 Id. at 23(b)(3)(D). 
 326 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:303 
groups according to location or perhaps type of injury.  There are 
more than 300,000 victims all over the world and, therefore, one 
large class would probably not be certified.88  It is likely that the 
prerequisites under Rule 23(a) could be met, but 23(b)(3) creates 
problems primarily because a class of people around the world would 
ensure significant management difficulties that a court could 
consider undue.89  Likewise, it is questionable whether a class action 
would be considered superior to all other methods since individual 
actions would be easier to manage. 
A solution to this problem would be to divide the large number 
of victims into multiple subclasses.  To do this, it would be necessary 
to look to a specific geographical area where a particular producer is 
known to have shipped landmines.  This would establish a discrete 
area where the tort took place.  Victims in that area could be 
organized and more easily notified of the suit.  As long as there are a 
sufficient number of plaintiffs to satisfy the numerosity requirement 
under Rule 23(a), the other class certification requirements would 
likely be met.  Since all plaintiffs would live in one geographical area 
and were injured by the same landmines, common questions of law 
or fact would exist.  Also, one particular victim would presumably 
have the same interests and injury as the other victims in that area, 
thus enabling him to represent the class fairly and adequately.  
Finally, common questions of fact or law would predominate such a 
subclass, rendering the class action mechanism superior to all other 
methods of litigation.  Dividing the hundreds of thousands of victims 
into subclasses would, therefore, allow for an efficient and speedy 
resolution. 
3.  Associational Representation 
A final consideration regarding class actions is whether a non-
governmental organization could bring a suit on behalf of landmine 
victims.  “An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its 
 
 88 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (rejecting a 
nationwide class for asbestos claimants because individual issues predominated over 
common issues). 
 89 In Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., the Fifth Circuit refused to certify a 
nationwide class because of “difficult choice of law determinations, . . . Erie guesses, 
notice to millions of class members . . . .”  84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996).  But see In 
re “Agent Orange,” in which the court allowed television ads and media publicity to 
serve as notice to thousands of class members.  In re “Agent Orange” Product 
Liability Litigation, 100 F.R.D. 718, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).  The class here may not be 
as big as the one in Castano, but the location of the potential plaintiffs, as well as their 
location in poor, technologically deprived countries would make notice especially 
problematic. 
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members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in 
their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the 
organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”90 
No current NGO is suitable for the purpose of representing 
landmine victims in such a legal action; however, if one were created, 
it would need to carefully define the relief sought through its action.  
If an NGO requested relief involving individual monetary 
compensation, some participation by the individual members would 
be necessary, therefore precluding the NGO from representing these 
individuals. 
On the other hand, an NGO might succeed with an associational 
representation approach if it limited its request to funding for a 
global trust fund in support of other NGOs and agencies that, in 
turn, would provide care and support for landmine victims.91  In 
terms of standing, management, and effectively representing 
landmine victims’ interests, an associational representation approach 
through a specially formed NGO—possibly tied to a global trust 
fund—offers an intriguing alternative beyond the scope of this 
Article, but worthy of future investigation. 
C.  Defendants and Personal Jurisdiction 
The range of potential defendants in landmine litigation is very 
broad, at least partially, because landmine production and the chain 
of distribution have involved a constellation of many entities in a 
number of the world’s states.92  Where the plaintiffs file their suit, 
however, will determine whom they can sue because a court must 
 
 90 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(2000).  It should be noted that most cases of this type have involved special interest 
organizations, such as environmental groups, or labor unions. 
 91 The concept of a global trust fund for landmine victims is not new and various 
ideas are currently under study by several mine action NGOs.  Nevertheless, the 
purpose of this Article is to explore compensation theories for landmine victims 
under U.S. law rather than the possible distribution and administration of funds for 
the benefit of the victims.  Although a global trust fund might provide a useful 
vehicle within the context of an associational representation approach, this Article 
takes no position on the trust fund concept itself. 
 92 It should be noted that in all potential defendant categories discussed in this 
Article, whether governmental or private, the term “landmine producers” includes 
the entire universe of entities involved in landmine production and the chain of 
distribution, from component suppliers through assemblage and final delivery to the 
buyers. 
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have personal jurisdiction over each named defendant in the case.93  
This means that a defendant is only subject to jurisdiction in those 
places it could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court . . . .”94  
The three basic conditions that render personal jurisdiction are 
actual presence,95 domicile, and business activity.96  Victims of 
landmine explosions could bring lawsuits against defendants in states 
where a producer is incorporated, where it has its primary place of 
business, or where it conducts continuous and systematic business.97  
The litmus test is whether a defendant has such minimum contacts in 
a forum state that the court, by exerting its jurisdiction over that 
defendant, does not “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”98 
1.  Potential Categories of Defendants 
Landmine victims can look to five categories of potential 
defendants.  First, they could sue the producers of the particular 
landmines that injured them.99  This case would be brought in a state 
where the defendant was domiciled, actually present, or conducting 
business. 
Second, in the more likely event that a plaintiff could not 
identify which specific landmine producer was responsible for his 
injuries, he could name multiple defendants under an enterprise 
liability theory.100  This presents a significant problem, however, 
because defendants’ products cause harm outside the United States.  
A landmine liability case is not like most products liability cases in 
which the product either causes harm in the state where the case is 
eventually brought or where it is placed into the stream of U.S. 
interstate commerce.  Landmines are not manufactured and used in 
the same place.101  In fact, they are not used in the United States at 
all.102  Rather, they are either manufactured by one company and 
 
 93 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) 
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
 94 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 95 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). 
 96 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317. 
 97 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
 98 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S at 316. 
 99 A producer who contracts with the U.S. government to produce some military 
item may be protected by the government contractor defense, which will be 
discussed thoroughly below.  See infra PART III.G.3. 
 100 For further discussion on the enterprise liability theory, see infra PART III.F.1.a.  
See also Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980). 
 101 EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 9. 
 102 Id. 
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then shipped overseas for use, or their components are 
manufactured separately by many companies, assembled in another 
place, and finally shipped overseas for use.103  It is unlikely that a 
single court would have personal jurisdiction over all potential 
defendants in a case like this.  Therefore, unless a defendant waives 
personal jurisdiction, which would be highly unusual, it would be 
nearly impossible to name many defendants from many different 
states in one federal court proceeding.  A possible solution to this 
problem could be to file many different suits in the appropriate fora 
and subsequently request that all cases be transferred to the judicial 
panel on multidistrict litigation for pretrial purposes.104  Though 
these cases would be remanded to the court in which they were 
originally filed, all discovery and pretrial tasks would be performed in 
a central location leading to a more efficient and economical 
resolution. 
Third, a plaintiff could attempt to sue all companies in the chain 
of distribution of a particular landmine in order to encompass all 
component part makers.  Again, the personal jurisdiction 
requirement makes this very difficult to accomplish in a single action.  
A separate lawsuit likely would have to be filed against each 
defendant in the appropriate forum. 
Fourth, a plaintiff could sue the government that contracted 
with the producer to make the landmine.105  This option presents a 
host of problems regarding governmental immunity for the United 
States and foreign sovereign immunity for other governments.  These 
are not personal jurisdiction problems, but rather are defenses that 
will be discussed in detail later in this Article.106 
 
 103 Id. 
 104 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(c)(i) (West 2002).  For this to occur, the action must be 
civil, there must be one or more common questions of fact, and the actions must be 
pending in different districts.  Id. at § 1407(a). 
 105 Suing the U.S. government under this theory raises the defense of sovereign 
immunity, which will be discussed in the defenses section below.  See infra PART 
III.G.3. 
 106 See infra PART III.G.  This category of potential defendants, including state 
factories and state-owned corporations, is the most problematic under U.S. law.  This 
by no means suggests that the U.S. government or other foreign sovereigns have not 
been involved, but their inclusion as defendants would immediately raise defense 
issues which in turn would dramatically alter the character of the potential litigation.  
Although other authors—most notably Professor Kenneth R. Rutherford—have 
presented some forceful legal and moral arguments that the United States and other 
sovereigns should bear the costs for compensating landmine victims, these 
arguments are grounded primarily on international law and are not the focus of this 
Article.  Under U.S. law, in addition to the likely defense issues, a more in depth 
discussion than is possible in this Article should include a thorough review of the 
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Finally, a plaintiff could sue both the producers and the 
governments with whom they contracted.107 
2.  Foreign Corporations 
A special problem arises when considering foreign corporations.  
Because U.S. courts may have a difficult time exerting jurisdiction 
over such corporations, a foreign corporation conducting business 
solely in another country will not meet the minimum contacts 
requirement for jurisdiction in the United States.  The Alien Tort 
Claims Act, however, grants U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants in tort actions where plaintiffs assert a tort claim that 
violates a U.S. treaty or the “law of nations.”108  This injects the need 
to argue that the use of landmines violates international law, an 
argument that has been well made previously, but it is not the focus 
of this Article.109 
 
Alien Tort Statute of 1789, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the act of 
state doctrine, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, and possibly the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 for their potential impact on jurisdiction. 
 107 It is interesting to note that even if a class sues a particular producer or group 
of component part-makers and is able to overcome the personal jurisdiction 
problems, the named defendants may move to join the United States or another 
government with whom the producer contracted.  In this case, a new set of problems 
arises with regard to joinder and intervention. 
 108 U.S. federal courts have jurisdiction over actions arising from a tort committed 
against an alien in violation of the “law of nations.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).  The 
“law of nations” has been interpreted to mean generally law dealing with the 
relationship among nations rather than individuals.  Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 
24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976).  Some courts have held that the statute can be invoked to 
confer federal subject matter jurisdiction in a private claim because all that is 
required is a violation of the “law of nations.”  Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 
(11th Cir. 1976).  Other courts, however, have held explicitly that the Act is only 
applicable between nations.  See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 
(D.C. Cir. 1985).  One obstacle facing the use of the Act in litigation against 
landmine producers may be that some courts interpret the Act to apply to individuals 
only, not corporations.  Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. 
La. 1997).  There may be, however, other precedent to contradict this notion—
Beanal is a district court decision and therefore not binding on other district courts.  
Moreover, this decision may be attacked on several grounds, including the notion 
that federal subject matter jurisdiction and federal diversity jurisdiction generally 
apply to corporations as well as individuals.  See Rivera Sanchez v. MARS, Inc., 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 187 (D.P.R. 1998).  The alien’s tort action may also provide subject matter 
jurisdiction over certain kinds of groups or organizations.  Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 
103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 109 See, e.g., R.J. Araujo, Anti-Personnel Mines and Peremptory Norms of International 
Law: Argument and Catalyst, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1997) (analyzing the 
problems of anti-personnel mines under international law).  See also Mary A. Ferrer, 
Affirming Our Common Humanity: Regulating Landmines to Protect Civilians and Children 
in the Developing World, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 135 (1996) (discussing the 
shortcomings of international law’s regulation of landmine use); Janet E. Lord, Legal 
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D.  Federal v. State Court Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
To bring a claim in federal court, the court must not only have 
personal jurisdiction, as discussed above, but also jurisdiction over 
the subject matter at issue.  A court has subject-matter jurisdiction 
where a question arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States, or where there is diversity of citizenship among the 
parties.110  For federal question jurisdiction to be present, the 
“plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action”111 must show that it 
was created by federal law, or “if the plaintiff’s cause of action is 
based on state law, a federal law that creates a cause of action is an 
essential component of the plaintiff’s claim.”112  This “well-pleaded 
complaint rule” does not allow the plaintiff to anticipate a federal 
defense to his claim nor does it allow a defendant to remove a case to 
federal court based on a federal defense.113 
In the potential landmine cases involved here, there is no 
“arising under” jurisdiction because there is no federal law at issue in 
the plaintiffs’ claims.  It is likely, though, that there will be diversity of 
citizenship.  Diversity, however, must be complete—no one plaintiff 
can be from the same state as any one defendant.114  Therefore, in 
these cases, it must be made certain that if numerous defendants are 
named, they cannot be from the same states as the plaintiffs.115  In the 
case of class actions, the rules change because only the named 
plaintiffs need be diverse to all the defendants.116  This should not 
present a problem in the types of cases under consideration here. 
If a landmine victim decides to sue a foreign government, the 
federal courts will have jurisdiction under The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA).117  Under the FSIA, federal district courts 
have jurisdiction over “a foreign state . . . as to any claim . . . with 
 
Restraints on the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and Environmental Crisis, 25 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 311 (1995) (discussing the problems landmines present under 
international law). 
 110 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 111 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
 112 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 274 (1999). 
 113 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). 
 114 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 
 115 A plaintiff’s “state” is determined by his place of domicile, which is defined as 
the place where he has his “true, fixed, and permanent home and principal 
establishment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent 
therefrom.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 112, at 294 (citation omitted). 
 116 See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); see also Mehlenbacher v. Akzo 
Nobel Salt, Inc., 216 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 117 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976). 
 332 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:303 
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . . .”118  
Regardless of the application of the FSIA, there still would be 
diversity jurisdiction between a landmine victim (a foreign national) 
and an alien defendant, including a foreign government. 
E.  Choice of Law 
When a case is litigated in federal court based on diversity 
jurisdiction, or where state claims are brought along with federal 
claims, the court must determine what state’s law applies to the 
controversy.  Each state has choice of law rules that it applies to a 
particular cause of action to determine what law applies.  As a general 
rule, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law 
rules of the state in which it sits.119  When a case is complex and 
involves many claimants from many different states, however, the 
choice of law rules become difficult to apply.  For instance, in tort 
cases, a state’s choice of law rules usually look to apply the law of the 
place where the tort occurred.120  When the tort occurs in a foreign 
nation, however, a question arises as to whether the federal court 
must apply the law of that foreign nation. 
In Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner,121 the plaintiff sued for a 
death and injury “resulting from the premature explosion of a 105-
mm howitzer round in Cambodia.”122  The district court and court of 
appeals held that Texas strict liability law applied to the occurrence.123  
This decision, however, ignored Texas’ choice of law rule, which 
mandated that the law of the place where the tort occurred should 
govern.124  Recognizing this conflict, the Supreme Court overruled 
the court of appeals and held that Texas should have applied its 
choice of law rule,125 resulting in the application of Cambodian tort 
law.126 
If landmine litigation is sustained in a federal court, it can be 
argued that instead of applying the substantive law of a particular 
 
 118 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). 
 119 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). 
 120 Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 121 423 U.S. 3 (1975). 
 122 Id. at 3. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See id. at 4-5 (holding that, in diversity suits, a federal court is to apply the 
forum state’s choice of law rule regardless of whether it points to the forum’s 
substantive law). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
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state, federal common law should be applied.127  In the “Agent Orange” 
products liability litigation, the Eastern District of New York applied 
“federal or national consensus common law to all substantive issues” 
at bar.128  In reaching this decision, Judge Weinstein surveyed five 
approaches to conflicts law.  These approaches, as will be discussed 
more fully below, included those based on: (1) the Restatement 
(First) approach; (2) the Restatement (Second) approach; (3) the 
governmental interest approach; (4) Professor Leflar’s analysis;129 and 
(5) the forum approach.130 
The First Restatement on Conflicts of Laws suggests applying the 
law of the place where the wrong occurred.131  This approach, taken 
by Texas’ choice of law rule, was ultimately applied in Challoner.132  
Cambodian law applied in that case because that is where the wrong 
occurred.  In “Agent Orange”, however, the court did not apply this 
approach because no party argued for the application of Vietnamese, 
Cambodian, or Laotian law.133  More importantly, the court stated 
that it would be “ludicrous” for the United States to apply the law of a 
place with which it had been, until recently, at war.134 
Similar logic could be applied in landmine cases.  The injuries 
have occurred all over the world including places entangled in civil 
war.  It is improbable and perhaps “ludicrous” to apply the law of a 
land with an unstable or transitional government and weak or 
changing rules of law.  Under the First Restatement, then, federal 
courts should not apply the law of a foreign nation.  Likewise, no 
particular U.S. state has more concern than another in the outcome 
of the litigation.  Therefore, a national consensus law should apply 
rather than state substantive law. 
The Second Restatement approach mandates that a court follow 
the statutory directive of the state in which it sits.135  When no 
directive is applicable, the court shall consider a number of factors to 
 
 127 The substance of federal common law can be determined by looking at “state 
law sources, the Restatement of Law of the American Law Institute, and other ‘non-
federal’ sources.”  See In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. 690, 696 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 128 See id. at 711. 
 129 Id. at 706 (describing the Leflar approach as taking into consideration “five 
choice-influencing considerations” in light of specific facts) (citation omitted).  See 
generally Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 267, 269 (1966). 
 130 See In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 708. 
 131 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377 (1971). 
 132 423 U.S. at 4-5. 
 133 In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 708. 
 134 See id. at 707. 
 135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6(1) (1971). 
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determine what law applies.  These include: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the 
relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other 
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of 
justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the 
particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity 
of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the 
law to be applied.136 
In a tort case specifically, the court must consider which state 
had the “most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties.”137  This will include an examination of where the tort 
occurred, where the conduct that caused the injuries occurred, the 
“domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties,” and where the relationship of the parties is 
centered.138  The court concluded, in “Agent Orange”, that where 
injuries occurred in all fifty states and other countries, where the 
products in question could not be identified as coming from any one 
defendant, and where “neither the plaintiff nor the defendant . . . 
[had] any significant contact with the [forum] state other than the 
fact that suit was filed in that state,” a particular state’s interests would 
not be considered in determining choice of law.139  In landmine cases, 
the only contact with the states in which suits would be filed, if any, 
would be the defendants’ places of incorporation, business, or 
residence.  Therefore, no state’s interest should be considered 
relevant. 
The governmental interest conflicts approach requires that the 
court “consider whether the public policy of a particular legislature 
would be furthered, frustrated or is irrelevant if applied in the case at 
bar.”140  The court held in “Agent Orange” that no one state would be 
affected; rather, the national legislature would be affected.  It would, 
therefore, be more appropriate to apply federal law.  The same 
rationale could be applied to landmine litigation.  Because the 
injuries did not take place in any U.S. state, the concern is a national 
rather than a local one. 
Under the Leflar approach, a court will consider the 
“predictability of legal result, maintenance of interstate order, 
 
 136 Id. at § 6(2). 
 137 Id. at § 145. 
 138 Id. 
 139 In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 701. 
 140 Id. at 706. 
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simplification of the judicial task, the forum’s governmental interests, 
and a preference for application of the better law.”141  Judge 
Weinstein found this last factor important, stating that federal law was 
more progressive and provided a better law.  It is possible that in the 
landmine litigation setting, a federal products liability law like that 
applied in “Agent Orange” would provide a more just result. 
The final approach considered by Judge Weinstein was the 
forum approach.  This approach applies when foreign law would 
normally govern, but neither party pleads such an application.142  
When this occurs, the court will apply the law of the forum in which it 
sits or dismiss the case.143  This rule simply reinforces the idea that 
national law is preferred to foreign law in cases tried in U.S. federal 
courts.  When the law of the forum state has not contemplated 
litigation similar to that before it, federal law will apply because the 
state lacks the resources to handle such litigation.144  It is likely that no 
state is prepared to deal with the magnitude of landmine litigation.  
Therefore, as with the other approaches, it would seem more 
appropriate to apply federal common law. 
Finally, there is a significant distinction to consider between 
“Agent Orange” and potential landmine litigation.  The plaintiffs in 
“Agent Orange” were members of the U.S. armed services and their 
families.145  Judge Weinstein’s opinion is rife with references to the 
distinct federal character of soldiers.146  Likewise, Judge Weinstein 
repeatedly mentions Congressional legislation passed to protect 
“Agent Orange” victims.147  This federal involvement cannot be found 
in the case of landmines.  The victims are civilians and no federal 
legislation has been passed to provide them with compensation for 
their injuries.  Federal involvement, however, still abounds.  
Landmine victims’ injuries would not have occurred had the United 
States not been involved in the making of landmines for warring 
nations.  It could be appropriate, therefore, for a court to apply a 
federal or national consensus law when considering choice of law in 
landmine litigation. 
 
 141 Id. at 707; see also Leflar, supra note 129, at 282-304. 
 142 In re “Agent Orange,” 580 F. Supp. at 708. 
 143 Id. 
 144 See id. at 709 (“[I]t has been clearly shown in this litigation why the law of the 
forum should be displaced in the face of the overwhelmingly national and federal 
aspects of the case.  A state court in such a position, having no preexisting applicable 
conflicts rule, would turn to federal or national consensus law.”). 
 145 Id. at 693. 
 146 Id. at 704. 
 147 See id. at 698, 704. 
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F.  Bases for Liability 
Landmine producers and their component suppliers made 
business decisions to enter the competitive landmine market where 
they designed, manufactured, and marketed their products in the 
hopes of generating financial profits.  By viewing landmines as a 
product manufactured for profit, the relevant U.S. substantive laws 
regarding potential liability for landmine related injuries are 
relatively straightforward.148 
1.  Products Liability 
The idea of liability is “founded on the opinion . . . that the 
defendant ought to have acted otherwise, or, in other words, that he 
was to blame.”149  Products liability can be based on either negligence 
or strict liability.  Negligence places blame on a defendant for failing 
to act with ordinary care, whereas strict liability focuses on the 
plaintiff’s injuries rather than the defendant’s behavior.150 
Products liability evolved both as a means to compensate injured 
plaintiffs and to provide a powerful incentive to producers, 
distributors, and sellers to provide fundamentally safe products.  
Knowing that financial damages could result from making, 
distributing, or selling a faulty product, gives producers an economic, 
if not, a moral incentive to protect consumers. 
a.  Negligence 
Negligence is an age-old concept that can be defined as 
“conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.”151  One acts 
within the appropriate standard when he acts with ordinary care, or 
as a “reasonable person of ordinary prudence under the 
circumstance . . . .”152  If a person fails to act with ordinary prudence 
and causes injury to another, then that person will be held liable for 
 
 148 This is not to minimize the complications discussed separately in this Article 
arising from the involvement of governments (in terms of immunity and related 
defenses), the enormity and complexity of the factual aspects, and the political and 
emotional issues. 
 149 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 82 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 
1971) (1881). 
 150 See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983) (Politz, C.J., 
dissenting) (“A negligence action focuses on conduct, specifically the quality of the 
act causing the injury; a strict products liability action focuses on the product itself.”). 
 151 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). 
 152 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 209 
(5th ed. 1984). 
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the resulting damages. 
Producers of products, like any other defendant, sometimes act 
outside the realm of ordinary care.  This breach of duty of care may 
manifest itself in a product defect or in a failure to produce safer 
designs, which may then result in injury to the products’ users.  
Further, that duty of care extends to innocent bystanders, thereby, 
extending the scope of the producers’ liability.153 
Regardless of their intended use, landmines are products just 
like automobiles, power tools, or blasting caps.  Landmine producers 
breached their duty of care by failing to design and produce 
landmines with available safety features, such as a self-destruct or self-
deactivating mechanism, which, if included, would have reduced the 
risk of injury to innocent bystanders.  Therefore, under a traditional 
negligence products liability theory, landmine producers should be 
held liable for injuries resulting from the use of their products. 
A key question that often arises in negligence products liability 
cases is whether a “defendant may exonerate itself by showing that it 
adopted and lived up to the standard existing in the industry.”154  In 
other words, if the entire automobile industry uses a faulty door latch 
system when safer designs would have prevented injuries, can 
individual producers be relieved of liability?  Judge Learned Hand 
answered this question in T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp.: 
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common 
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may 
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.  
It never may set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages.  
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions 
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse 
their omission.155 
Even before the United States entered the Vietnam War, it was 
possible to create a landmine with a self-destructing mechanism.156  
Most mines, however, were not made with these mechanisms because 
doing so would have added cost and reduced the attractiveness of the 
landmines in the marketplace.  The entire industry’s failure to 
employ self-destruct mechanisms will not excuse the decision of 
individual companies and government agencies not to forge ahead 
for the protection of innocent civilians.  Under this theory, the 
importance of a self-destruct mechanism toward reducing the risks 
 
 153 See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973). 
 154 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT AND INJURY LAW 175 (1990). 
 155 T.J. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 156 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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for innocent civilian bystanders is so “imperative that even its 
universal disregard [does not] excuse its omission.”157 
In the alternative, if a court will not accept the failure to employ 
a self-destruct mechanism as a per se breach of duty, another theory 
could be advanced.  This approach would define landmines as 
defective.  Because landmines are doing what they were designed to 
do when they maim or dismember victims,158 it becomes more 
difficult to find a defect as defined by traditional products liability 
theory.  The failure to use a reasonable alternative that would have 
made a product safer has been held to constitute defective design 
and, thus, a breach of duty.159  Landmines, therefore, might be 
considered defectively designed products because there was a safer 
and more reasonable alternative available to landmine producers. 
After the plaintiffs establish a breach of a legally recognized duty 
by the landmine producers, they must then show that the breach 
caused their injuries.  There are two types of causation: causation in 
fact and proximate causation.160  Causation in fact can be established 
by looking at the facts in question and applying either the “but for” 
or the substantial factor test.  If the plaintiffs’ injuries would not have 
occurred “but for” the defendants’ wrongful conduct, there is 
causation.  The substantial factor test requires the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant’s behavior was a substantial factor in bringing 
about his injury, and must also be a material element of the injury.161  
Proximate causation is more difficult because it “involves a policy 
determination made by the court that requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that a defendant’s actions occurred through a linear 
 
 157 60 F.2d at 740. 
 158 “The mine has been designed with a view to disable personnel.  Operating 
research has shown that it is better to disable a man than to kill him.”  EXPOSING THE 
SOURCE, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting Technical Specifications for Mine Anti-Personnel 
(P4MK2), PAKISTAN ORDINANCE FACTORIES BROCHURE); see also Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices 
(Amended Protocol II), amended May 3, 1996, 2 U.S.T. 105-1, at 37 (defining anti-
personnel landmines as “mine[s] primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more 
persons”). 
 159 Townsend v. Gen. Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418 (Ala. 1994); Timothy D. 
Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining A 
Suitable Role for the Tort Systems in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1, 13 
(2000) (discussing guns as a defective product). 
 160 See Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact: 
Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L. 
REV. 311, 311-14 (1990). 
 161 KEETON ET AL., supra note 152, § 41, at 267-68. 
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chain of events and were not broken by an intervening third party.”162 
A plaintiff must also prove both general and specific causation.163  
General causation means that the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant’s product was capable of causing his injury; whereas 
specific causation requires a showing that the defendant’s product 
did cause his injury.164  While general causation could be proven, 
specific causation may create potential problems for landmine victims 
if not dealt with properly.  In many cases, plaintiffs may not know the 
producer of the mine that injured them.  Presumably, if the 
particular producer cannot be identified because mines explode into 
numerous pieces, it may be difficult to prove that one producer 
caused a victim’s injury. 
There are two solutions to this problem.  First, plaintiffs could 
argue that, just as in the “Agent Orange” case, general causation 
suffices.  In “Agent Orange”, Judge Weinstein allowed the plaintiffs to 
recover even though they could not prove which defendants’ 
chemicals caused their injuries, only that each defendant’s product 
could have.165  This inability to prove specific causation was then 
taken into account when compensation was determined.  Therefore, 
everyone who was injured recovered damages, but less than they 
would have had they been able to prove specific causation.166  
Plaintiffs who could not even prove general causation, though, could 
not recover under “Agent Orange”.  Unless a plaintiff could prove his 
injury was “of the kind caused by defendant’s conduct” and that he 
was “placed at risk by the defendant’s acts,” he could not recover.167 
Landmine cases are very similar to the “Agent Orange” cases.  
After a mine explodes, there is no way to determine the producer.  
Therefore, if proving specific causation is a requirement, few 
plaintiffs could ever recover.  It is necessary to adopt the logic of 
Judge Weinstein in “Agent Orange” regarding specific causation if 
justice is to be done. 
 
 162 James Pizzirusso, Note, Increased Risk, Fear of Disease and Medical Monitoring: Are 
Novel Damage Claims Enough to Overcome Causation Difficulties in Toxic Torts?, 7 ENVTL. 
LAW. 183, 184 (2000). 
 163 Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 164 See Wheat v. Sofamor, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999). 
 165 597 F. Supp. at 782, 827 (drawing a parallel to alternative liability in the 
asbestos realm, stating “the plaintiff does not determinatively prove which producer’s 
asbestos caused his injury.  A prima facie case is shown if the plaintiff can prove that 
he was exposed to the defendant’s products on at least one occasion.”). 
 166 Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for 
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 893 (1982). 
 167 Id. 
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The second solution to the specific causation problem is for the 
plaintiffs to assert an enterprise liability theory.  This theory was first 
asserted and accepted in Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. in 
1972.168  In that case, thirteen children sued the producers of blasting 
caps.169  These incidents occurred in twelve distinct situations in ten 
different states.170  The plaintiffs did not know which company made 
which blasting caps, so they sued every blasting cap producer.171  The 
court allowed the plaintiffs to name all producers as defendants 
because they comprised the entire blasting cap industry.172  Likewise, 
the court there found the defendants to have “adhered to an 
industry-wide standard with regard to safety features of blasting caps . 
. . .”173 
Enterprise liability was again asserted in Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories.174  In that case, “[t]he plaintiff, a cancer victim whose 
mother ha[d] ingested DES when pregnant with her,”175 named 
numerous pharmaceutical companies as defendants, claiming they 
collaborated in the “production, marketing, promotion and testing of 
DES,” and were thus responsible for her injuries.176  The plaintiff 
argued that instead of the burden being on her to prove that a 
particular producer’s product caused her injuries, the burden should 
be placed on the defendants to prove they were not the producer 
whose product injured her.  When most of the producers were 
unable to show they were not the ones who injured the plaintiff, the 
court apportioned liability in proportion to that company’s share of 
the DES market.177  Likewise, the plaintiffs in landmine litigation 
could name all known landmine producers and then assert that if 
 
 168 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 169 Id. at 359. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 358. 
 172 The individual trials in this case resulted in judgments for the defendants on 
other grounds.  See Lehtonen v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 
633 (D.  Mont. 1975); see also Davis v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 400 F. 
Supp. 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Ball v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 519 F.2d 
715 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 173 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934. 
 174 Id.  The enterprise liability theory is asserted very often in large products 
liability cases.  See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass’n Inc., 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 
1993) (applying theory used in case against multiple lead pigment manufacturers); 
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing enterprise 
liability theory).  See also Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of 
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978). 
 175 Delgado, supra note 166, at 882. 
 176 Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934. 
 177 See Delgado, supra note 166, at 882. 
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none can prove that they were not the maker of the particular 
landmines in question, they must be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries 
in proportion to their share of the landmine market. 
A final causation problem is that of superseding or intervening 
causes.  A plaintiff’s case may be thwarted if a defendant can show 
that a superseding or intervening event actually caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries.178  In the case of landmines, defendants could argue that any 
number of events might have occurred between the time of the 
manufacturing and shipping of the landmines and the time of the 
explosion.  For instance, it is possible that third parties buried the 
mines incorrectly, altered the mines, or acted criminally179 in order to 
cause the types of injuries at issue.  Of course, they might also argue 
that landmines should have been retrieved or destroyed by the 
original users after their intended use, and that such failure 
constituted a misuse of the product. 
Although landmine producers might make these arguments, 
they are not likely to prevail because, when the mines were made, the 
companies knew the potential risks for tampering and misuse—the 
occurrence of foreseeable intervening acts cannot exonerate the 
producers from liability.  The producers were aware of the possible 
shipment to terrorists or to third parties not trained in mine 
technology.  Because of this, the producers should not be relieved of 
liability simply because the expected occurred. 
b.  Strict Liability 
Strict liability, unlike negligence, does not look to place blame 
on the defendant.  Rather, it focuses on the plaintiff’s injuries and 
places the cost of that injury on the person more able to absorb the 
loss.  Strict liability is divided into two separate concepts: product 
defects and abnormally dangerous products.180 
Defective product strict liability is based on the idea that a 
producer of a defective product is “in the best position to either 
 
 178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440-441 (defining superceding and 
intervening causes); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 152 § 44, at 312 (asserting that 
defendant is not liable for injuries caused by superceding or intervening causes that 
are not foreseeable). 
 179 Third party criminal acts, which qualify as intervening or superseding in the 
explosives field, include “the acts of distributors who fail to prevent criminal theft of 
explosives, retailers who sell explosives to criminals, or terrorists who intentionally 
misuse explosives to inflict harm upon others . . . .”  Alan Calnan & Andrew W. 
Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological & Regulatory 
Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REV. 177, 253 (1999). 
 180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965). 
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insure against the loss or spread the loss among all the consumers of 
the product.”181  The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: 
[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to liability for 
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, . . 
. if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it 
is sold.182 
This rule applies even if the seller has acted with reasonable care and 
has no contractual relationship with the user or consumer.183 
 The rules governing strict liability are based on years of case law 
that have established public policy interests as the rationale for 
attachment of such liability.  All of these interests are directly 
applicable to the case of landmines, including: the substantial cost of 
injury to a victim as compared with the ability to insure the risk of 
injury by the seller;184 the public interest in discouraging producers 
from marketing defective products;185 the inability to prove 
negligence because of the secretive nature of manufacturing 
processes;186 and the inability of a plaintiff to investigate thoroughly 
the safety of a particular product.187 
The production and use of landmines could also be defined as 
abnormally dangerous activities.  “Abnormally dangerous activity” is 
defined as including six factors: (1) the “existence of a high degree of 
risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;” (2) the 
“likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;” (3) the 
“inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;” (4) 
the “extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;” 
(5) the “inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is 
carried on;” and (6) the “extent to which its value to the community 
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.”188  The production of 
 
 181 Ogle v. Catepillar Tractor, 716 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1986) (citing William L. 
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability on the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 
1120 (1960). 
 182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)(1) (1965). 
 183 Id. at § 402(A)(2). 
 184 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63 (Cali. 1962). 
 185 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cali. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring); see also Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829, 
843 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Harber v. Altec Indus., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 954, 963 (W.D. Mo. 
1993). 
 186 Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 187 Id. 
 188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1979). 
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landmines meets every condition under this definition.189  It is almost 
certain that a person, land or chattel will be injured.  The harm that 
occurs when a landmine explodes often includes dismemberment or 
death.  Landmine producers could not completely eliminate the risk 
by using reasonable care because even the installation of self-destruct 
mechanisms would not eliminate all risk.  Landmines, despite the 
tens of millions sold, are not a matter of common usage.  The 
presence of sixty to seventy million landmines in post-conflict areas is 
anything but appropriate to the place.  Finally, landmines arguably 
provide absolutely no value to any community that could be weighed 
against their dangerous attributes. 
If landmine production is held to be an abnormally dangerous 
activity, then the producers will be liable “for all injury resulting from 
the activity . . . regardless of who was at fault.  The injury must, of 
course, be one of the kinds of harm which one expects given the 
dangerous nature of the activity.”190  The kinds of harm which 
landmines have caused for decades have been precisely what every 
landmine producer could have expected.  The producers of 
landmines have created an enormous risk of civilian injury or death, 
and they have profited from creating such risk.  Therefore, under 
strict liability, the burden of the loss should be placed on the 
producers. 
A potential problem with strict liability is that many 
manufacturers produce only components of landmines.  Therefore, a 
question of fairness arises.  Should a component part maker be held 
strictly liable even though its particular part may not have been 
defective or its particular contribution may not be abnormally 
dangerous?  The Consumer Protection Act provides guidance in 
answering this question.191  It mandates that component part makers 
will be liable unless “they can show the defect was a result of 
instructions given by the manufacturer of the final product or was 
 
 189 Another interesting attempt to utilize this analysis is being applied in gun 
manufacturer litigation.  These cases seek to determine whether gun manufacturers 
should be held strictly liable for injuries or deaths caused by their productsnamely 
handguns.  See, e.g.; Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986); Copier 
By & Through Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998).  See 
generally Joi Gardner Pearson, Comment, Make It, Market It, and You May Have to Pay 
For It: An Evaluation of Gun Manufacturer Liability for the Criminal Use of Uniquely 
Dangerous Firearms in Light of In Re 101 California Street, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 131 
(1997). 
 190 Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635, 639 
(N.D. Ill. 1987). 
 191 Consumer Protection Act, 1987, Ch. 45 § 1 (Eng). 
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due to negligence on the part of the final product manufacturer.”192  
Taking a different approach, section five of the Restatement Third of 
Torts states that a component part seller is liable for the harm caused 
by its component part if (1) the product (the component part) is 
defective, or (2) the seller substantially participates in the integration 
of the component part into the end product.193  If the first prong of 
the Restatement is met, “the plaintiff must [also] show that the 
product defect caused the harm,” whereas if the second prong is met, 
“the plaintiff must also show that the integration of the component 
part caused the [end] product to be defective.”194 
These two sources provide a guide for what a court might do 
regarding landmine component part makers.195  If landmine victims 
could show that the producers knew the product they were 
manufacturing would become part of a landmine, liability could 
apply and, following the Consumer Protection Act, the component 
part makers could be liable. 
The analysis is a bit more involved under the Restatement.  
Under the Restatement, a landmine victim would have to show either 
that the product was defective and that defect caused him harm, or 
the particular component part maker substantially participated in the 
integration of its part with the whole and that the part caused the 
whole to be defective.  In the end, a court would have to consider the 
special use of landmines and the knowledge of the makers in 
determining whether strict liability should apply. 
2.  Negligent Entrustment 
Another possible cause of action against landmine producers is 
negligent entrustment.  One may be held liable for this tort if he 
”permit[s] a third person to use a thing or to engage in an activity” 
that is under his control and where he “knows or should know that 
such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself 
in the activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others.”196  A claim of negligent entrustment will be upheld if 
 
 192 Susan H. Easton, The Path for Japan?: An Examination of Product Liability Laws in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, 23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 311, 
319-20 (2000). 
 193 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5 (1998). 
 194 Carly E. Beauvais, Products Liability: Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 
712 (R.I. 1999), 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 791, 793 (2000). 
 195 Several courts have followed these approaches in the past.  See, e.g., Moor v. 
Iowa Mfg. Co., 320 N.W.2d 927 (S.D. 1982); Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., Inc., 
733 A.2d 712 (R.I. 1999). 
 196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts § 308 (1965). 
 2003 COMPENSATING LANDMINE VICTIMS 345 
the plaintiff can prove that the product is highly dangerous, the seller 
had “specific knowledge of the buyer’s dangerous intent or is witness 
to conduct that clearly evinces his unsuitability to use the product, 
and, given the available information, the seller displays a reckless 
disregard for the safety of the buyer or others whom she may 
injure.”197  This tort has been used in cases where plaintiffs claim gun 
producers have negligently entrusted guns to buyers who have then 
criminally or tortuously injured the plaintiffs.  Only one of these suits, 
however, has been successful,198 while all others have been summarily 
dismissed.199 
In the case of landmines, producers create a dangerous 
instrumentality and then sell it overseas to warring countries or 
factions within countries.  Though landmine producers most often 
negotiate with governments, these same producers know or should 
know that landmines will end up in the hands of people not qualified 
to handle them properly.  These producers also know that some of 
the landmines they entrust to buyers subsequently will be sold to 
terrorists and criminals.  This conduct is in reckless disregard for the 
safety of many civilians who, as a result, will undoubtedly be maimed 
or killed by landmines. 
3.  Intentional Torts 
The key to committing an intentional tort is, of course, intent.  
Without it, there can be no finding of liability.  Advancing an 
intentional tort theory in the case of landmines is more difficult than 
the other options discussed above.  This is primarily because the 
intent element is difficult to satisfy.  Battery and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress arguably could have applications for landmine 
victims.  Public nuisance and trespass would, at best, be difficult 
claims for victims defined in this Article, although these claims might 
be effective for property owners in areas affected by landmines. 
Battery is the intentional harmful or offensive touching of 
 
 197 See Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 156, at 268. 
 198 See Kelley v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (holding that “it is 
entirely consistent with public policy to hold the manufacturers and marketers of 
Saturday Night Special handguns strictly liable to innocent persons who suffer 
gunshot injuries from the criminal use of their products,” and that such liability is 
“warranted”). 
 199 See Court Dismisses Negligent Entrustment Claim in Chicago Suit Against Gun Makers, 
28 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 142 (Feb. 21, 2000); see also Copier By & 
Through Lindsey v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998); City of 
Phila. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 902-04 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Penelas v. 
Arms Techn., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
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another.200  In the case of landmines, a plaintiff could assert that the 
producers intended harmful or offensive touching to occur when 
their landmines exploded, but because the intent of the producers is 
to harm combatants, a plaintiff must assert transferred intent.  
Transferred intent means that “if A aims at B, and hits C, C can sue A 
for battery, even though he was not the intended victim and even 
though battery is an intentional tort.”201  Battery is a plausible cause of 
action where victim (C) is a civilian, as would be the case for all 
plaintiffs here, even though producer (A) was aiming for combatants 
(B).  The difficulty here is not the transfer of intent, but rather the 
intent itself.  Plaintiffs would need to show that landmine producers 
(A) intended to harm combatants (B). 
A person may be liable for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress if he “by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another . . . .”202  A 
landmine victim may be able to sustain such a cause of action if he 
can show that the production of landmines is extreme or outrageous 
conduct.  This may be difficult because landmines are considered a 
viable weapon in combat situations.  Considering the extremely 
hazardous and indiscriminate character of landmines, however, it is 
possible that their production may be determined extreme.  The fact 
that the purpose of landmines is to maim and mutilate substantially 
helps the victim’s case.203  
It is also possible that those who witnessed the explosion, which 
dismembered or killed a family member, could file a claim.  In order 
to bring such a claim, the plaintiff would have to show that he is 
“closely related to the injury victim,” was “present at the scene of the 
injury-producing event at the time it [occurred] and [was] aware that 
it [caused] injury to the victim and . . . as a result [suffered] 
emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated by a 
disinterested witness.”204  It is probable that family members 
witnessing the injury of a landmine victim could prove such a case, 
although the issue of intent remains problematic. 
Public nuisance is the “unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public.”205  To determine if an “unreasonable 
 
 200 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). 
 201 Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 202 Russell v. Salve Regina College, 649 F. Supp. 391, 400 (D.R.I. 1986) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)). 
 203 See EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 5. 
 204 Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989). 
 205 Lytton, supra note 159, at 45-46. 
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interference” has occurred, there must be a factual determination 
about how the conduct in question “(1) is proscribed by statute; (2) 
involves a significant interference with public health, safety, peace, 
comfort, or convenience; or (3) is of a continuing nature and has 
produced long-lasting and significant effects on a public right, of 
which the defendant knows or has reason to know.”206  The state or a 
private citizen can bring a public nuisance claim.  Lighting fireworks, 
storing explosives, and emitting loud and disturbing noises have all 
been held to be public nuisances.207  Landmines certainly are more 
disturbing than these examples, yet it would be difficult to reach the 
landmine producers under this claim since they likely are too far 
removed from the actual nuisance activity. 
Trespass to land is an invasion “(a) which interferes with the 
right of exclusive possession of the land, and (b) which is a direct 
result of some act committed by the defendant.”208  The insertion of 
explosives into private land by buyers of landmines would be an 
invasion of an owner’s possessory interest in the land.  Whether the 
producers of landmines could be held liable for this invasion, 
however, is questionable.  Though the producers know their 
landmines will be planted, this typically occurs during armed conflicts 
and the producers’ relationship to those who physically plant the 
mines is very attenuated.  Further, as with public nuisance, only those 
who own property under which mines have been planted would have 
standing to sue. 
In sum, none of the possible intentional torts offer viable causes 
of action for plaintiff landmine victims as defined in this Article. 
G.  Defenses 
Assuming any action in a landmine case would follow products 
liability or strict liability theories, the possible defenses are relatively 
straightforward.  The more unusual and stronger defenses arise 
primarily from the character of landmines as weapons and the 
involvement of either the U.S. government or foreign governments in 
the contracting or licensing of exports. 
 
 206 Id. 
 207 See generally Landau v. City of New York, 72 N.E. 631 (N.Y. 1904); State v. 
Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 169 S.W. 267 (Mo. 1914); Town of Preble v. Song 
Mountain, Inc., 308 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970). 
 208 See Joshua M. Penrod, Note, Refusing to Torture the Ancient Doctrine of Trespass: 
Kernan v. Homestead Development Co., 4 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 67, 68-
69 (2000). 
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1.  Statutes of Limitations and Equitable Tolling 
A threshold issue for a landmine suit, as with any civil litigation, 
is whether or not the suit is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  This issue is complicated in the case of landmines 
because of the multiple jurisdictions in which the injuries occurred 
and because there is no set jurisdiction for bringing suits against 
landmine producers.  To determine the proper statute of limitations, 
courts follow three steps:209  first, they “look to the federal law for 
guidance;” second, in the absence of a federal proscription, they 
“look to state common law;” and third, if state common law is 
inconsistent with the intent of the federal law, they do not apply state 
law.210 
As the first step in the analysis, one of the few federal statutes 
helpful to foreign victims of landmines is the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(the ATCA).211  The ATCA applies “where . . . an alien sues . . . for a 
tort . . . which was committed in violation of the law of nations.”212  
Any foreign national meeting all three requirements may bring suit 
in the U.S. federal courts.  This is key for landmine victims who may 
not have access to a judicial forum in their home country, or for 
those who live in a country with no laws allowing such a claim.  The 
matter, however, becomes complicated by the ATCA’s silence on the 
issue of timing.  The ATCA has no statute of limitations.213  In fact, 
while some federal statutes regarding human rights or genocide, such 
as the Torture Victims Act, provide definite time limits,214 most leave 
that issue open.215 
Since there is no federal time limit on suits brought under the 
ATCA or other federal statutes that might provide guidance, federal 
courts next look to apply the limitations period of the “most closely 
analogous statute of limitations under state law.”216  Looking at case 
law, the courts have held that “a federal district court sitting in 
diversity must apply the choice of law precepts of the forum state.”217  
 
 209 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000). 
 210 Justin H. Roy, Strengthening Human Rights Protection: Why the Holocaust Slave 
Labor Claims Should Be Litigated, 1 SCHOLAR 153, n.381 (1999). 
 211 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 212 Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 2000 WL 1411100, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2000). 
 213 Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 462 (1999). 
 214 28 U.S.C. section 1350 bars claims that are over 10 years old.  Roy, supra note 
210, at n.375. 
 215 For example, in 28 U.S.C. section 1331, “there is no prided statute of 
limitations.”  Roy, supra note 210, at 199. 
 216 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 217 Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 472. 
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To determine what state law is most applicable, courts must look to 
the state law most closely analogous.  If the injury sustained by the 
plaintiff has a counterpart in a state statute, that law’s statute of 
limitations will be used. 
Plaintiffs in a landmine injury case would assert tort claims, 
which, in most states, involve a relatively short statute of limitations, 
typically two to three years from the time of injury.218  Nevertheless, 
equitable estoppel principles can bar defendants from raising the 
statute of limitations defense under certain circumstances in which 
there was fraud, concealment, deception, or other misconduct by the 
defendant.219  Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations for 
landmine victims could depend both on the choice of forum and of 
the particular causes of action. 
State law still might not provide the appropriate statute of 
limitations.  In cases where the state law is in conflict with the spirit of 
a federal act or statute, “a narrow exception to this rule [exists] when 
another federal statute or rule ‘clearly provides a closer analogy than 
available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the 
practicalities of litigation make the [federal statute] a significantly 
more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.’”220 
Finally, and most importantly, equitable tolling principles offer 
another avenue for tolling the statute of limitations in a landmine 
case.  The facts of landmine cases are unique and suitable for the 
application of equitable tolling principles.  Most of the world’s 
landmines are located in developing countries with numerous legal 
systems or, in some cases, little or no rule of law.  Landmine victims 
often live in poverty with very limited healthcare services, legal 
assistance, or even current news available to them.  Further, some of 
the mines were placed in their current locations decades ago.  The 
 
 218 In Illinois, for example, there is a ten-year statute of limitations for an action 
for breach of a written contract; a five-year statute of limitations “for breach of an 
oral contract, or for other civil actions without an express time period;” a five-year 
catch-all statute; and a two-year statute for personal injury claims.  Sampson v. Fed. 
Rep. of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 219 For example, under the New York equitable estoppel principle, “[a] party may 
be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense where his fraud, 
concealment, or deception prevented the plaintiff from timely filing his claim.”  Roy, 
supra note 210, at 201.  Pennsylvania common law also recognizes equitable tolling in 
certain causes of action: “common law negligent misrepresentation in the business 
context . . . does recognize equitable tolling in such circumstances.”  In re Chambers 
Dev. Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602, 627 (W.D. Pa. 1994). 
 220 Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 462 (quoting Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 
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victims themselves may not be aware of the avenues available to them 
to obtain relief because many reside in desolate areas of the world.  
They cannot afford representation and often are unaware of the 
possibility of bringing a suit at all.  Still other nations of origin may 
not have the proper laws in place to bring a suit against landmine 
producers and may not be aware of U.S. laws until most statute of 
limitation periods have already run out.  On the whole, preparation 
of any suit or even determining which producers are the proper 
defendants for a particular suit likely would require a great deal of 
time.  To alleviate the injustice to those victims, there are ways for 
tolling the statute of limitations. 
Two circumstances in which equitable tolling can stop the 
statute of limitations are: 1) “where the defendant has actively misled 
the plaintiff”;221 or 2) where a defendant has concealed “facts that 
would alert the plaintiff to the plaintiff’s claim.”222  This is 
problematic for landmine victims because they would need to prove 
that a failure by defendant producers to notify buyers of a safer 
alternative was misleading or constituted concealment.  Further, such 
failure to notify the landmine buyers should be extended to the 
plaintiffs who ultimately suffered injuries as a result.  Even so, 
[e]quitable tolling applies in the “usual case” where an injured 
party remains ignorant of fraudulent conduct without any want of 
diligence or due care on his or her part.  In such case, the bar of 
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is 
discovered, even where [a] defendant has not taken special efforts 
to conceal the fraud.223 
In such cases of concealment, the key is to look to the date when 
items were made public.224 
It could be argued that landmine victims, often situated in 
locations where access to current information is very limited, have yet 
to learn that their injuries might have been prevented.  Failing to 
show concealment, plaintiff landmine victims might argue that the 
doctrine of unclean hands allows for equitable tolling if they could 
show that the defendants conspired or otherwise actively withheld 
information from the plaintiffs regarding safer alternatives.225  The 
weakness of these arguments, in addition to the obvious burden of 
 
 221 Id. at 467. 
 222 Bodner, 2000 WL 1411100, at *15. 
 223 Quote contained in a Westlaw headnote preceding In re Chambers Dev. Sec. 
Litig., 848 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Pa. 1994). 
 224 Roy, supra note 210, at 201. 
 225 Id. 
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proof problems, is that any alleged concealment of facts by the 
defendants was from the landmine buyers, not the plaintiffs. 
A related but somewhat broader approach for tolling statutes of 
limitations seeks to avoid injustice by considering special 
circumstances beyond the control of plaintiffs.  These “[e]quitable 
tolling principles apply in cases where a defendant’s wrongful 
conduct, or extraordinary circumstances outside the plaintiff’s 
control prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim timely.”226  The 
statute of limitations should toll, for example, where plaintiffs have 
been denied access to other countries’ courts;227 where defendants 
were immune from suit during a particular time period;228 or where 
there is a genuine fear of reprisals.229 
A stronger approach to applying equitable principles for 
landmine victims is to consider their knowledge or, more accurately, 
their lack of knowledge.  “The essence of the doctrine of ‘equitable 
tolling’ of a statute of limitations is that the statute does not run 
against a plaintiff who is unaware of his cause of action.”230  Given the 
very nature of many civilians injured by landmines, especially those in 
areas where access to the courts or other avenues for relief is either 
non-existent or minimal, it seems unjust to deny them a legal remedy 
simply because they had no way of knowing they could bring a suit. 
Finally, “[u]nder the continuing violation doctrine, ‘the 
limitations period for a continuing offense does not begin until the 
offense is complete.’”231  Due to the permanent nature of landmines, 
in courts that adhere to this equitable tolling principle, the statute of 
limitations will not run until all landmines are removed or detonated.  
Because this task would take an enormous amount of time, possibly 
measured in decades, the victims of landmines would be free to 
pursue their claims of relief without being barred by time limitations. 
 
 226 Stephanie A. Bilenker, In Re Holocaust Victims’ Assets Litigation: Do the U.S. Courts 
Have Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuits Filed by Holocaust Survivors Against the Swiss Banks?, 
21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 251, 275 (1997). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 229 See Fleischhaker v. Adams, 481 F. Supp. 285, 292 (D.D.C. 1979) (disallowing 
tolling where fear of reprisals was subjective); see also Jones v. Sauls Lithograph Co., 
Inc., 1978 WL 27 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1978) (tolling did not apply where plaintiff’s fear 
of reprisal was unsubstantiated). 
 230 Bodner, 2000 WL 1411100, at *15 (quoting Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 
F. Supp. 108, 113 (D. Conn. 1978)). 
 231 Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Venture, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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2.  Conventional Tort Defenses 
The fact situations for landmine victims as potential plaintiffs 
would preclude most conventional tort defenses such as consent, 
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.232  Even in instances 
where landmine victims knew or should have known an area might be 
infested with landmines, it seems unlikely that defendant landmine 
producers would raise these defenses against the claims of severely 
injured landmine victims as a strategic matter in court. 
Even the tort defense of superceding causes233 would be difficult 
to raise because, in most instances, landmines were used as intended, 
and producers knew or should have known that combatants rarely 
remove landmines after their military use ends.  This defense might 
have application where landmines were used to depopulate civilian 
areas, such as placement in schools and water supplies, but in that 
instance the defense might strengthen plaintiffs’ claims for negligent 
entrustment. 
3.  Governmental Immunity 
If landmine victims were to assert tort claims against the U.S. 
government, the governmental immunity defense would be a viable 
defense for the government.  The fact that the U.S. government is 
generally free from liability or suit stems from the idea that “the King 
can do no wrong.”234  Though this statement does not necessarily ring 
true, governmental liability and judicial review of legislative or 
executive action does present separation of powers problems.235  
Therefore, governmental immunity offers a way to avoid such 
problems.  The only way the government could be held liable would 
 
 232 “One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his 
interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting 
from it.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979) (consent defense).  The 
defense of assumption of the risk applies where a plaintiff is “actually aware of a 
reasonable risk and voluntarily undertakes it.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
APPORTIONMENT § 3 cmt. c.  Contributory negligence (also called comparative fault) 
is where the plaintiff’s “negligence that is a legal cause of an indivisible injury to the 
plaintiff reduces the plaintiff’s recovery in proportion to the share of  responsibility 
the fact finder assigns to the plaintiff.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF APPORTIONMENT § 7. 
 233 “A superceding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its 
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his 
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). 
 234 KEETON ET AL., supra note 152, at 1033 (quoting Borchard, Governmental 
Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Parker, The King Does No Wrong – Liability 
for Misadministration,5 VAND. L. REV. 167 (1952)). 
 235 See Tucson Airport Auth. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
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be if the plaintiffs could assert a civil rights violation.  In that case, the 
government could be held liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
which mandates that the government, in such cases, be treated just as 
any private individual would be treated.236  Nevertheless, it is 
improbable that landmine victims could prove civil rights claims 
against the United States for the use of or exportation of landmines. 
If landmine victims were to assert tort claims against foreign 
governments, governmental immunity again would present a viable 
defense.  Foreign governments are generally immune to suit in U.S. 
courts under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act.237  This is true 
unless one of the seven enumerated exceptions apply.238  The only 
provision that may apply to the mine cases is the third clause of the 
second exception.  That clause says that foreign sovereign immunity 
will not attach if the actions at issue occurred outside the territory of 
the United States, were in connection with a commercial activity of 
the foreign state elsewhere, and caused a direct effect in the United 
States.239  Family members of landmine victims could bring causes of 
action if they argue that the commercial activity carried out by a 
foreign government in contracting with landmine producers (foreign 
or domestic) caused a direct effect in the United States because that 
is where their damages—loss of consortium, emotional distress, etc.—
occurred. 
 
 236 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-72, 2674-80 (West 2000). 
 237 28 U.S.C.A. § 1330 et seq (West 2000). 
 238 The exceptions are found in 28 U.S.C.A. section 1605 and include: (1) waiver 
of immunity by the foreign government; (2) actions based “upon a commercial 
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act 
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and causes a 
direct effect in the United States”; (3) actions involving the illegal taking of property 
in the United States or exchanged for United States property by a foreign state; (4) 
rights to United States property are at issue; (5) actions “in which money damages 
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of 
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortuous act or omission 
of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment;” (6) actions that are “brought either to 
enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private 
party to submit to arbitration”; (7) actions “in which money damages are sought 
against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of 
torture, extra judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of 
material support or resources . . . for such an act if such act or provision of material 
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while 
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.”  28 U.S.C.A. § 
1605 (West 1994). 
 239 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (a)(2). 
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4.  “Feres-Stencel” Doctrine 
Members of the United States Armed Forces injured during 
service have no cause of action against the government or the 
producers of the products that injured them.  This rule of law 
developed out of two cases, Feres v. United States240 and Stencel Aero 
Engineering Corp. v. United States.241  In Feres, the Court held that U.S. 
servicemen and women could not recover for injuries negligently 
caused by the government.242  In Stencel, the Court extended such 
armed services immunity to producers of military equipment when it 
held that no recovery could be had even if the producers’ negligence, 
not the government, caused the injury.243 
The Feres-Stencel defense is not viable in the landmine cases.  
Courts have extended the defense so that derivative claims, such as 
birth defects of a child caused by a father’s contamination with Agent 
Orange, have been rejected under Feres-Stencel.244  Innocent bystanders 
or family members independently injured, however, have been 
immune to the Feres-Stencel defense.245  It is likely, therefore, that the 
Feres-Stencel doctrine does not apply here since the injured parties are 
civilians, not servicemen or women. 
5.  Government Contractor Defense 
The most obvious defense for landmine producers that have 
contracted with the U.S. government is the government contractor 
defense, which effectively is an extension of sovereign immunity.  
This defense would be possible only for potential defendants in the 
United States, but not to foreign landmine producers. 
The government contractor defense can be used by producers 
that contract with the U.S. government to make products intended 
for use in armed conflict to shield those producers from liability 
under the principles of sovereign immunity.246  The policy behind this 
defense is to encourage private producers to contract for what are in 
essence government activities, which, if conducted by the 
government, otherwise would be protected under sovereign 
immunity. 
 
 240 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 241 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
 242 Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 243 Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673. 
 244 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 245 See id. at 161. 
 246 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514 (1988). 
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a.  Elements of the Defense 
In the case of landmine manufacturing, the private producers 
would need to establish the three elements of the defense and avoid 
the four exceptions to the defense.  Elements of the government 
contractor defense are: (1) “the United States approved reasonably-
precise specifications;” (2) “the equipment conformed to those 
specifications”; and (3) “the producer warned the United States 
about dangers in the use of the equipment known to the producer 
but not to the United States.”247  Landmine producers, in raising the 
defense, would assert that the United States provided them with the 
specifications with which to develop landmines; that they conformed 
their products to those specifications; and, finally, that they warned 
the United States about all dangers involved. 
Under Boyle v. United Technologies, Corp., the government 
contractor defense could prove a viable one unless the plaintiffs can 
show that at least one of the elements is missing.248  The plaintiffs’ 
best argument here is that the third element, requiring warning to 
the United States, is lacking.  To succeed, the plaintiffs must proffer 
evidence that the self-destruct technology available since 1964 or 
earlier was not brought to the attention of the U.S. government.  
They must make clear that had the United States known the dangers 
of landmines without self-destruct devices, it would have changed its 
specifications to include the self-destruct design. 
The U.S. experience in Vietnam supports the proposition that it 
was not properly warned of such dangers.  In Vietnam, landmines 
caused thirty-three percent of all U.S. casualties and twenty-eight 
percent of all U.S. deaths.249  There, ninety percent of all mine and 
booby-trap components used against U.S. troops were of U.S. 
origin.250  If landmine producers had notified the United States of 
safer landmine designs before or during the Vietnam War, it is not 
logical that the United States chose to ignore or reject these safer 
alternatives that could have reduced the high casualty rates for its 
own troops.  In this instance, under a strict government contractor 
defense analysis, the defense fails because even if precise 
specifications were provided and followed, the producers did not 
make the United States aware of known dangers. 
 
 247 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 501. 
 248 Id. 
 249 EXPOSING THE SOURCE, supra note 4, at 6. 
 250 Id. at 6.  Another report found that, in Vietnam during 1965, between sixty-five 
and seventy percent of United States Marine Corps casualties resulted from 
landmines and booby-traps.  DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 18. 
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b.  Exception to the Defense 
In addition to the requirement that producers provide warnings 
of the product’s dangers, several other exceptions to the government 
contractor defense have developed over time and may help the 
landmine victims recover against producers. 
The most helpful exception to the government contractor 
defense concerns the cost of change versus the cost of accident 
analysis.  “[I]f the financial burden of changing a product is less than 
the accident costs produced by that product, the defendant-producer 
will be found negligent for failing to make such reasonable safety 
alterations.”251  This exception could prove to be the most helpful in 
the landmine cases because there was a safer alternative design since 
1964 or earlier.  The cost of adding self-detonating devices would 
have been far less than the cost of the accidents.  This exception 
could, therefore, prevent the landmine producers from avoiding 
liability via the government contractor defense. 
A second exception is that, although the defense is available in 
cases of defective design, it does not apply to defective manufacture 
cases.252  This exception may be problematic in this case because to 
support their negligence claim, the plaintiffs will assert that the 
offending landmines were defectively designed.  It would, therefore, 
be fatally inconsistent to argue on the one hand a design defect and 
on the other a manufacturing defect. 
The third exception to the government contractor defense 
allows a producer to be held liable when its immunity has been 
contracted away.  This could occur with an indemnification clause, a 
designation of the producer as an independent contractor, or an 
insistence that the producer will carry liability.  Unless the contracts 
involved any of these provisions, this exception is unlikely to apply. 
The fourth exception allows producer liability when the 
producer used its discretion in producing the product.253  This 
exception is similar to the third element of the government 
contractor defense requiring warning to the government of the 
dangers.  This exception may prove helpful if plaintiffs could show 
that the landmine producers used their discretion in not informing 
the government of the safer alternative, or in not using the safer 
alternative.  When decisions are made by the contractor and the 
 
 251 Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 179, at 239. 
 252 See Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1990).  
But see Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1488-89 (C.D. Cal 1993). 
 253 Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 179, at 223. 
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government “merely accepts [such decisions], without any substantive 
review or evaluation,” the contractor can be said to be using its 
discretion, and thus unable to assert the government contractor 
defense.254 
c.  Extending the Defense to Landmine Exports 
Another issue regarding the government contractor defense is 
whether the defense extends to landmines produced in the United 
States but exported directly to foreign entities.  All arms exports from 
the United States, including landmines, are regulated and must be 
licensed by the U.S. government through provisions of the Arms 
Export Control Act.255  The rules and procedures vary depending on 
if the foreign entity (a foreign government or private company) first 
approaches the U.S. government or the arms producer.256 
When the foreign entity approaches the U.S. government, the 
President of the United States is ultimately responsible for the 
supervision of all such contracts, which, once accepted, may then be 
put out for bidding by U.S. producers.257 
When the foreign entity directly approaches the U.S. producer, 
the President remains responsible but the procedures differ.258  Only 
producers that have registered with the U.S. government to export 
specific items from the “U.S. Munitions List” of defense items259 may 
enter into export contracts.  They then must obtain an export license 
from the Department of State and, for substantial contracts, approval 
of Congress.  There is no judicial review of the approval or denial of a 
license.  Therefore, once the U.S. government denies a producer the 
right to export a particular munitions list item, there is no appeal and 
the sale can go no further. 
When U.S. landmine producers directly contract with foreign 
entities, this latter issue regarding the government contractor defense 
is implicitly extended to cover the exporting activities because the 
U.S. government provided a license.  This presents a novel issue for 
the courts.  Weighing in favor of the immunity extension is the fact 
that the U.S. government has ultimate authority over what sales will 
be allowed and what items are suitable for export.  The policy giving 
 
 254 See Trevino, 865 F.2d at 1480; see also Kleeman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 890 
F.2d 698, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 255 22 U.S.C.A. § 2551 et seq. (West 2000). 
 256 See id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at § 2778. 
 259 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1993). 
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rise to the defense, however, does not necessarily support such an 
extension because arms exporting by private producers appears to be 
more a commercial than governmental activity.  Further, the 
government contractor defense includes relatively strict guidelines 
limiting denial of liability.  The extension of the defense to exports 
contradicts the apparent intent by broadening the coverage of 
immunity to a greater range of activities. 
d.  Summary of Government Contractor Defense 
Applicability 
In sum, plaintiffs would have plausible arguments that the 
government contractor defense should not shield landmine 
producers in the United States, regardless of whether those 
producers contracted with the U.S. government or exported directly 
to foreign entities under license from the U.S. government.  Gauging 
the strength of plaintiffs’ arguments is impossible, however, until two 
key questions can be answered.  First, more factual information is 
needed to learn if producers properly notified the government of the 
danger of not using self-detonating devices as a safer alternative.260  
Second, regarding arms exports, courts must address the novel legal 
issue of whether government licensing implicitly extends the defense 
to those transactions. 
H.  Possible Relief for Landmine Victims 
In terms of possible relief for landmine victims, this Article 
argues that the need is great and that at least some liability should 
rest with the entities that created, profited by, and, quite possibly, 
were in a position to have avoided much of the landmine threat to 
civilians.  Assessing the actual damages suffered by landmine victims 
and what relief they might seek is well beyond this Article’s scope.  
The following discussion reviews possible approaches and the 
difficulties involved. 
 
 260 In the alternative, the successful application of the government contractor 
defense by landmine producers in the United States—by defendants proving they 
had properly notified the U.S. government of safer alternatives—would raise other 
potentially troubling questions.  This possibility would shift the focus to the U.S. 
government regarding its continued specification, use, and export of the more 
dangerous mines despite the high casualty rates for U.S. troops in Vietnam and the 
highly foreseeable long-term danger for civilians throughout the world.  The most 
probable defense for the United States in this instance would be sovereign immunity, 
as previously discussed.  Sovereign immunity by itself could provide a legal defense, 
but it would offer little explanation for the government’s decision to ignore or reject 
safer alternative landmine designs. 
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1.  Equitable Remedies 
Any plaintiff claiming injury from a product might seek 
equitable remedies including injunctions against the continued 
manufacture and sale of that product in its dangerous form, removal 
of the product from locations where it might cause injury to future 
plaintiffs, and destruction of existing inventories of the product.  In 
the instance of landmines, these are precisely the actions called for 
under the Mine Ban Treaty (the Treaty).261 
Organizations currently monitoring for compliance with the 
Treaty, as well as investigating landmine production and use 
generally indicate that dramatic progress has been made in reducing 
or even eliminating landmine production, export, sale, and use in 
most of the world.262  Demining activity has increased, although it 
remains dangerous, expensive, and well behind the pace most 
proponents believe is necessary.263  Limited stockpile destruction has 
commenced in some signatory states.264 
Even if U.S. courts could assert their authority to enforce 
equitable remedies regarding landmines, the Treaty as well as the 
political and public campaigns accompanying it appears to be 
accomplishing many of the necessary tasks.265  Plaintiff landmine 
victims in U.S. courts seeking equitable remedies would find little to 
enjoin within the United States.  No authority exists to enjoin 
activities outside the United States, and the Treaty and accompanying 
campaigns already are reducing the landmine threat.  In any event, 
eliminating landmine production, sale and use, and demining and 
 
 261 The “Mine Ban Treaty’s” long title—Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction—
addresses its primary functions. 
 262 See, e.g., MONITOR, supra note 6, at 620 (noting that Germany has destroyed all 
of its 1.7 million antipersonnel mines); id. at 685 (noting that the United Kingdom 
has already destroyed a “large proportion” of its stockpile). 
 263 See id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 The Landmine Monitor Report states that, at the time of its publication, 135 
countries had signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 
1-2.  These countries included virtually all of the European Union, forty of the forty-
eight countries in Africa, several of the major producers in Asia, and most of the 
heavily mine-affected countries around the world.  Notable non-signatories included 
the United States—joining Cuba as the only non-signatories in the Western 
Hemisphere—and, of the world’s other major producers, Russia, China, India, and 
Pakistan.  Yet each of these, except Pakistan, had expressed their eventual intention 
to sign the Treaty or have stated their support for the ultimate goal of a 
comprehensive prohibition.  Progress on banning production, trade, and use, as well 
as demining, destruction of stockpiles, and other mine action activities, are 
documented throughout the report.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 2. 
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destroying stockpiles, address the threat to future victims but they 
offer nothing for the landmine victims who are the subject of this 
Article. 
2.  Damages 
The world’s landmine victims have suffered severe injuries from 
their innocent contact with defendant producers’ products.  An 
accurate estimate of the total monetary damages is neither available 
nor realistically possible.  Nevertheless, a brief review of how damages 
are conventionally valued under U.S. law is instructive.  This section 
will briefly review the conventional approach in the United States to 
valuing damages, and then will attempt to establish the scale, 
including only compensation for landmine victims as previously 
defined and excluding costs associated with other mine action 
activities such as demining.266 
When plaintiffs bring negligence actions, their ultimate goal 
typically is to obtain a remedy in the form of monetary damages.  
Such monetary relief can be in the form of compensatory damages or 
punitive damages.  Plaintiffs will be able to recover compensatory 
damages for all losses that have proximately resulted from the tort 
and all losses that will so result in the future if proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.267  Punitive damages, “[which] 
represent a sum in excess of any compensatory damages . . . are 
usually available only when the tortfeasor has committed quite 
serious misconduct with a bad intent or bad state of mind such as 
malice.”268 
 
 266 Demining cost estimates are substantial.  While the number of mines to be 
removed is approximately sixty to seventy million, the most accepted method for 
estimating demining costs is based on area covered rather than number of mines.  
MONITOR, supra note 6, at 17-18.  This varies by location, method, and clearance 
standards (e.g., the U.N. standard is 99.6 percent clearance).  For example, the cost 
of mine clearance in Kuwait was about $0.7 billion (and 84 deminers’ lives) for 728 
square kilometers, or just under $1 million per square kilometer.  In Afghanistan, 
the cost was $621,889 per square kilometer.  MONITOR, supra note 6, at 18.  The 
difficulty with this approach is finding an agreement on how much area is to be 
demined since not all infested areas necessarily will be demined (e.g., deserts).  A 
less accurate method uses dollars per mine, which has been widely reported at $300 
to $1,000 per mine.  Assuming sixty to seventy million landmines, this equals $18 to 
$70 billion to demine the world.  The United States, with a stated goal “to rid the 
world of anti-personnel landmines which pose a threat to civilians by the year 2010,” 
leads the world in demining funding, having spent $63 million in 1998 and $58 
million in 1999 in 26 countries.  TO WALK THE EARTH IN SAFETY, supra note 5, at 4.  
Assuming U.S. funding continues at this rate, and that the rest of the world matches 
the amount, it would take 1,500 years to reach $18 billion. 
 267 DAN B. DOBBS, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS 1047 (2000). 
 268 Id. at 1062. 
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a.  Compensatory Damages Generally 
When determining the compensatory damages due to a plaintiff, 
the goal is to “fairly and adequately” calculate the losses he 
sustained.269  To do this, it is necessary to look to two types of losses: 
tangible and intangible. 
Tangible losses, also called pecuniary or liquidated losses, are 
those damages that can be calculated mathematically including 
medical bills, lost wages, and lost earning capacity.270  Medical bills 
include those “incurred in treating, curing and alleviating the 
plaintiff’s physical and mental injuries,”271 including “diagnostic tests, 
drugs, medical devices and artificial limbs . . . .”272  “[It] does not 
depend upon whether the plaintiff has actually paid the doctor’s 
bills.”273  Lost earnings can be recovered “if the plaintiff is wholly or 
partly unable to carry out gainful activity as a result of tortuously 
inflicted injury.”274  Lost earnings may include actual wages, fringe 
benefits, and wages based on expected future advancement.275  Lost 
earning capacity even applies when a plaintiff was not working at the 
time of the injury, but because of the injury, will have a diminished 
earning capacity in the future.276 
Intangible losses, also referred to as unliquidated damages, may 
include pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and future 
damages.277  Recovery for intangible losses is left to the discretion of 
the judge or jury.  Pain and suffering claims include “any form of 
conscious suffering, both emotional and physical.”278  Often, loss of a 
body part or loss of a bodily function involve more pain and suffering 
than other injuries.  Likewise, suffering or embarrassment resulting 
from disfigurement rises to the level necessary for substantial 
recovery.  Loss of enjoyment of life “[permits] recovery for the 
plaintiff’s mental reactions to pain and to [his] sense of loss.”279  
Future damages include “(1) [r]esiduals or future effects of an injury 
which have reduced the capability of an individual to function as a 
whole [person]; (2) future pain and suffering; (3) loss or impairment 
 
 269 Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1982). 
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of earning capacity; and (4) future medical expenses.”280  Each 
component must be valued in the context of the community 
standards in which the plaintiff resides and, after compensatory 
damages are tabulated, they must be adjusted to take into account 
present value and inflation.281 
b.  Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages can only be recovered if compensatory 
damages have been recovered.  Punitive damages are awarded with 
the goal of changing the defendant’s behavior or providing 
incentives for others in similar businesses to change their behavior.  
To award punitive damages, a court must find circumstances of 
aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil 
motive on the part of the defendant, or a conscious and deliberate 
disregard of the interests of others so that his conduct may be called 
willful or wanton.282  To calculate punitive damages, judges and juries 
have relied upon the following factors: “(1) the reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the defendant’s wealth; (3) the 
profitability of the misconduct; (4) litigation costs; (5) the aggregate 
of all civil and criminal sanctions against the defendant; and (6) the 
ratio between the harm caused or potentially caused by the 
defendant’s misconduct and the losses suffered by the plaintiff.”283  
Punitive damages are often awarded in cases where defendants 
engaging in economic activity cause harm to plaintiffs.  In calculating 
such damages, the defendant’s financial status will be considered to 
determine how much money would inflict the proper liability.284 
For landmine victims, punitive damages would be much more 
difficult to recover than compensatory damages.  Landmine victims 
would need to show that the producers undertook outrageous 
conduct or acted with conscious or deliberate disregard for the 
interests of others.  Such willful and wanton conduct includes a 
conscious disregard for the risk to safety of life or property.  Here, it 
 
 280 Flannery, 297 S.E.2d at 436. 
 281 See Green v. General Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super 507, 530-44, 709 A.2d 205, 
217-23 (N.J. 1998); see also, DOBBS, supra note 267, at 1058 (citing Jones v. Laughlin 
Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983) (using a low interest rate to reduce future 
award to present value)); Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (estimating future inflation and increasing the award); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 
434 P.2d 665 (Alaska 1967) (allowing the present value and inflation adjustment to 
equal each other). 
 282 Rouse v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 459 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ohio 1983). 
 283 DOBBS, supra note 267, at 1066-67. 
 284 See id. 
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could be argued that producers knew or should have known their 
refusal to include self-destruct mechanisms would cause severe 
injuries to post-conflict civilians.  It would be difficult at best to 
succeed with this argument.  If punitive damages were awarded, 
however, they almost certainly would be meaningful for landmine 
victims because the financial wealth of the defendants would be 
considered a factor in setting the award amount. 
c.  Assessing Landmine Victims’ Compensatory Damages 
If liability were found, landmine victims presumably could 
recover compensatory damages.  Punitive damages always would be a 
possibility, but are not considered here. 
The first component of compensatory damages for landmine 
victims is recovery for all medical bills, lost earnings, and lost earning 
capacity.  As noted previously, the ICBL has estimated the immediate 
medical care at $9,000 per victim.285  Add to this figure all continuing 
medical costs such as prosthetic re-fittings, at about $125 each for 
anywhere up to thirty times (for a child), and the figure easily 
exceeds $10,000.286  Other ongoing medical costs such as subsequent 
surgeries, therapy and treatments would add at least a few thousand 
dollars.  A very conservative combined figure might be $15,000 to 
cover all emergency medical care, continuing surgeries and medical 
care, therapy, prostheses, and related costs. 
Lost wages and lost earning capacity are nearly impossible to 
compute given the number of victims and the various countries from 
which they come.  Yet even in developing countries, a victim’s 
lifetime of diminished income at the very least ranges from a few to 
perhaps tens of thousands of dollars. 
Damages for pain and suffering would likely be significant since 
the trauma of a landmine injury is substantial.  In fact, since many 
landmine victims lose appendages, they could be entitled to the 
damages associated with such a traumatic loss as well as the potential 
stigma arising from disability and disfigurement.  Many amputees 
suffer throughout their lives with phantom pains and are burdened 
with continuing medical treatments for their injuries.  Landmine 
victims also could be entitled to recover for loss of enjoyment of 
many everyday activities, such as familial and social interaction, that 
are made substantially more difficult as a result of a disfiguring injury. 
 
 285 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 286 See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 130 (giving figure of $125 per prosthesis 
and estimating that a ten year old child with a life expectancy of forty to fifty years 
would need twenty-five prostheses). 
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The incomprehensible terror and suffering associated with 
being severely injured by a landmine can hardly be measured 
monetarily, but this is the only way for a victim to be compensated.  
Putting a number on such suffering is nearly impossible.  However, in 
lawsuits all over the world, and especially in the United States, this is 
what judges and juries do every day—put a monetary number on 
injuries for which there cannot possibly be just compensation.  For 
example, hundreds of lawsuits are filed each year in which a plaintiff 
has lost an appendage due to some type of accident.  In Cook 
County, Illinois, a typical award of damages for a loss of a leg ranges 
from $800,000 to $1 million.287  In non-metropolitan areas of the 
United States, this number decreases substantially, but is still 
measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars.  While it is true that 
landmine victims have not been injured in Cook County, Illinois, or 
even in the United States, these numbers give an idea of just how 
much an appendage is considered to be worth in certain parts of the 
United States. 
In sum, adding the possible component elements of a lifetime of 
medical costs and lost income, but before including intangible losses, 
the compensatory damages figure should be an average of at least 
$20,000 per landmine victim. 
Intangible damages are harder to estimate.  What value could be 
placed on a landmine victim’s pain and suffering, loss of limb, 
disability, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment?  In Cook County, 
such a figure could range in millions of dollars.  If under U.S. law $1 
million or more is a just amount for an individual severely injured in 
Cook County, what figures would be appropriate for victims in 
Mozambique or Cambodia or any other landmine-infested country?  
These questions need not be answered here. 
It seems reasonable, however, to suggest that $20,000 would only 
begin to compensate a person—regardless of where they might 
reside—for the devastation of their life.  Assuming the United 
Nations estimate of 250,000 amputees as the most conservative 
estimate of total landmine victims, total compensatory damages (not 
including any intangible losses) would be at least $5 billion. 
 
 
 287 See also Basic Injury Values for Leg Crush Injuries and Amputations, 2 PERSONAL 
INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK 14, 18-19 (reporting U.S. mean award values of: 
$3,164,525 for below the knee amputations, $4,170,346 for above the knee 
amputations, and $11,104,955 for bilateral leg amputations; as well as, U.S. mean 
settlement values of: $1,053,860 for below the knee amputations, $1,885,747 for 
above the knee amputations, and $2,872,027 for bilateral leg amputations). 
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Five billion dollars is an overwhelming amount for the 
developing countries where most of the sixty to seventy million 
uncleared landmines are located.  Compared with the thirty-four 
countries that exported many of those mines, however, the same $5 
billion represents less than 0.1 percent of their combined annual 
budgets.288  Although U.S. law does not normally permit considering 
relative wealth except with punitive damages, it is impossible to 
ignore the inequities in this instance.  Landmine victims reside 
primarily in the poorest countries of the world and, through no fault 
of their own, suffered devastating injuries from landmines.  Many of 
these mines were manufactured and exported for a profit from the 
world’s wealthiest countries.  These exporting countries not only can 
afford to provide the needed relief on a humanitarian basis, these are 
the same exporters who quite possibly could have avoided most of the 
victims’ injuries by originally including self-detonating mechanisms in 
the mines. 
 
 288 Most recent budget estimates available for the thirty-four identified landmine 
exporting countries, including the United States but excluding China, Iraq, and 
Yugoslavia, total more than $5 trillion. CIA, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2000). 
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IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The facts are appalling.  Each day new victims are added to the 
300,000 men, women and children who have been severely injured 
and maimed by an unseen menace.  Most of these victims receive 
inadequate medical care and little or no long-term therapy.  Already 
among the poorest people in the world, the devastation to their lives 
is unimaginable. 
The menace is not an earthquake, flood, or other natural 
disaster—just the opposite.  Business people and government officials 
from thirty-four countries, including the wealthiest countries and 
corporations ever known, made the decision to produce and export 
anti-personnel landmines.  They sold tens of millions of their product 
in a competitive market.  They designed and enhanced their product 
to make it more effective and cheaper.  They knew or certainly 
should have known that their product would continue to 
indiscriminately maim and kill innocent civilians for decades after 
serving its intended military purpose. 
Could the producers have designed their product to serve its 
military purpose but without threatening so many post-conflict 
civilians?  Evidence suggests the technology was available forty years 
ago.  If producers had employed this technology, perhaps many of 
the world’s 300,000 victims would be whole today and most of the 
sixty to seventy million landmines still threatening civilians would not 
exist. 
Yet if such technology was available that could have avoided so 
much injury, suffering and expense, then why was it largely ignored?  
Why did producers continue to make and sell millions of cheap, 
“dumb” landmines year after year? 
The truth of how and why these decisions were made in the 
business of producing and selling landmines may never be known 
and, in fact, is not really important.  The decisions were made.  As a 
result, hundreds of thousands of civilians have been severely injured 
through no fault of their own.  A business product directly caused 
their injuries, and evidence suggests that the producers knew of a 
safer and reasonable alternative that could have avoided many of 
those injuries. 
Under U.S. law, this fact situation raises several liability theories 
through which the victims could receive compensation for their 
injuries from the makers of the product.  This Article has reviewed 
those theories, the possible defenses, the jurisdictional and 
procedural matters, and some of the practical aspects.  The result is a 
complex picture with many issues. 
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In terms of substantive law, the primary theories of liability are 
fairly straightforward.  These are founded on well established policies 
under U.S. law.  Negligence holds producers liable if their failure to 
act with ordinary care caused injury to another.  This not only places 
the financial burden on the party that caused or could have avoided 
the injury, it compensates the victims and it creates an incentive to 
provide fundamentally safe products in the future.  The theory of 
strict liability approaches liability differently.  It does not look to 
assign blame, but instead focuses on compensating persons injured 
by defective or abnormally dangerous products while placing the 
costs where they are best able to be absorbed. 
Applying these theories to a product that has injured so many 
innocent, post-conflict civilians supports the concept of holding 
landmine producers liable.  What can become confusing, however, is 
the fact that landmines were produced for the military purpose of 
injuring, or at least threatening to injure, people.  This is not 
inconsistent with landmines being a product—indeed, they have 
been privately and publicly produced, sold and exported in a 
competitive world market.  It does, however, give rise to a special 
defense that extends sovereign immunity to protect military 
contractors, the “government contractor defense.”  This Article has 
explored that defense and found that it does not apply to all 
landmine producers and that even in those instances it may not apply 
if the producers failed to warn the U.S. government that a safer 
alternative was available.  Further, the Feres-Stencel defense does not 
apply since these victims are post-conflict civilians.  Other, more 
conventional tort defenses such as contributory negligence or 
assumption of risk also do not fit the fact situation. 
The greatest difficulties in any case of landmine victims as 
plaintiffs against landmine producers as defendants are primarily 
jurisdictional, procedural and practical. 
Hundreds of thousands of prospective plaintiffs reside in dozens 
of countries.  They have suffered a wide range of injuries over an 
extended period of time from a product made by at least 100 
corporations and governmental agencies in thirty-four countries.  
While many of these producers are located in or have sufficient 
contacts with the United States, and no other legal system in the 
world would be better positioned to hear these plaintiffs’ complaints, 
U.S. jurisdiction is uncertain.  This Article has reviewed the possible 
bases for U.S. jurisdiction and several approaches regarding standing.  
No single best approach is apparent.  Rather, in terms of jurisdiction, 
standing and procedural matters, the possibilities are more strategic 
and tactical matters, which are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Practical concerns are the most daunting.  Information about 
landmine producers and their involvement in the trade is hard to 
find.  Locating and contacting so many plaintiffs who speak a variety 
of languages, often live in remote regions, and are accustomed to 
different cultures and legal systems would be a monumental task.  
Finally, the list of prospective U.S. and foreign defendants would 
seem to raise conflicts of interest obstacles for many attorneys, even if 
they had the interest and financial wherewithal to represent 
predominantly poor foreign nationals on a long, difficult and 
speculative campaign. 
But returning to the initial goal of compensating the world’s 
landmine victims—the theme of justice for these people—should the 
largely jurisdictional, procedural and practical difficulties matter?  
Did not the landmine producers make decisions that weighed their 
business interests against the highly foreseeable and devastating 
injuries their products inflicted on 300,000 innocent men, women 
and children?  Should justice be denied because it is difficult? 
One response might indeed argue that, yes, we must face reality 
and the effort to remedy some tragedies is too great.  But this tragedy 
was neither natural nor unavoidable.  People, who received money 
for their product and quite possibly could have avoided much of the 
tragedy, created it.  Further, the financial reality is that the remedy’s 
cost might require less than 0.1 percent of one year’s revenues from 
the producers who spread millions of landmines around the world.289  
Compare that with the everyday reality landmine victims must 
confront.  Through no fault of their own, these products from Italy 
or Singapore or Wisconsin or California have disintegrated their 
limbs, embedded debris into their bodies, and blinded, deafened, 
burned, and disfigured them.  Most victims who survived this trauma, 
shock, and massive blood loss then face a dismal future for the 
remainder of their lives. 
If these victims had been injured in the United States by 
defective or abnormally dangerous products, it seems highly unlikely 
the U.S. government, courts or people would hesitate to hold the 
producers liable regardless of whether those producers were U.S. or 
foreign, private or public.  Few would then argue that the 
jurisdictional, procedural or practical difficulties were too great. 
At this point, the distinction between legal and moral arguments 
becomes unclear and perhaps unnecessary.  This Article was not 
 
 289 This figure was calculated based on the combined annual government budgets 
of the producing countries. 
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intended to promote litigation so much as to suggest that landmine 
producers, whose products have caused severe injury to so many 
innocent people, can and should be responsible for compensating 
those victims. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, if purely humanitarian interests controlled, the best 
result would simply have the landmine producers voluntarily join 
together and contribute their proportionate shares to a fund for the 
world’s landmine victims.  This fund would not undo the injuries, but 
it could provide adequate care to return them to as productive and 
meaningful lives as possible given their devastating injuries.  This 
Article estimates such a fund at $5 billion for the purposes of 
discussion. 
Whatever the amount, it is an overwhelming figure for the 
countries in which most landmine victims reside; yet it is a 
remarkably small cost for the producers who made and exported the 
landmines.  Measured against the pain, suffering, and devastation 
inflicted on 300,000 innocent people, it seems a rare and relatively 
inexpensive opportunity to correct one of the world’s greatest 
injustices. 
                                                          
 
